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I. INTRODUCTION
In the 1993 Report of the National Performance -Review, the
Clinton administration launched the federal government on a new
course in environmental policy: ecosystem management. 1 Based on
Vice President Gore's recommendation, the President directed all
agencies to implement ecosystem management across the country.
Also in 1993, the Florida Legislature directed the newly created
Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) "[tjo protect the
functions of entire ecological systems through enhanced coordina2
tion of public land acquisition, regulatory, and planning programs."
Seizing on this direction, the state agency began its own reexamina3
tion of how environmental policy is implemented in Florida.
Both the federal and state agencies charged with implementing
ecosystem management began developing individualized ecosystem
management principles which were gleaned from existing literature 4
and tailored, in sometimes subtle ways, to reflect the goals and
mission of the particular implementing agency. In 1994, an interdisciplinary group of scientists and professionals developed and refined
a set of site specific ecosystem management principles for the Everglades ecosystem under the auspices of the United States Man and
5
the Biosphere Program (USMAB).
Three dominant themes can be distilled from ongoing efforts to
identify a set of generic principles to guide the management philosophy known as "ecosystem management." These include: (1) the

1. AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETER
AND COSTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 52-53 (Sept. 7,1993), available

at 1993 WL 366395.
2. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-213 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 20.255 (1995)) (officially
titled Florida Environmental Reorganization Act of 1993); see also FLA. STAT. §§ 20.255(1)-(2)
(1995) (creating DEP and instructing it to ensure implementation of the ecosystem management
provisions of chapter 93-213, Laws of Florida).
3. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, BEGINNING ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: AN ACTION PLAN FOR DEVELOPMENT OF AN ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IMPLEMEN-

TATION STRATEGY (1994).
4. See, e.g., Margaret A. Moote et al., W.R.R.C., Principles of Ecosystem Management Oan.
1994) (unpublished manuscript, on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of
Florida College of Law).
5. The authors of this manuscript participated in the nine day Everglades charette organized by USMAB's Human Dominated Ecosystems Directorate. UNITED STATES MAN AND THE
BIOSPHERE PROGRAM, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, US MAB HUMAN-DOMINATED SYSTEMS

DIRECTORATE WORKSHOP ON ECOLOGICAL ENDPOINTS AND SUSTAINABILITY GOALS 8-9 (May
1992) [hereinafter USMAB]. The organizers used the Biosphere Reserve model and the freshly
minted ecosystem management principles as the organizational basis for this exercise in
scenario consequence analysis of "ecological endpoints" involving the Everglades ecosystem.
Id. at 5-6; see also Mark A. Harwell, Ecosystem Management to Achieve Ecological Sustainability: The
Case of South Florida,ENVTL. MGMT. (forthcoming 1996) (giving a complete synopsis of the five
year history of the process).
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notion of boundaries, both geographical and institutional; (2) scientific uncertainty; and (3) governance. This article analyzes the manner in which the present legal and institutional framework for
environmental management addresses these themes.
Part II identifies the problems inherent in defining the appropriate management unit for ecosystem management and in delineating
the unit's boundaries in the face of inherently complex and unstable
ecological factors. Part II also considers the more insidious institutional boundaries that influence the effectiveness of agencies established under the traditional resource management paradigm that
existed prior to the ecosystem management regime.
Part III examines the manner in which the legal system treats
scientific uncertainty. Two principles of ecosystem management involve uncertainty: (1) the best science available; and (2) adaptive
management. The principle that ecosystem managers must use the
best science available suggests that the complete absence of scientific
certainty should not be a basis for failing to make management decisions. To address uncertainty, ecosystem management principles
have adopted a methodology known as adaptive management.
Adaptive management encourages policy and management experimentation as a means to discover appropriate approaches to manag6
ing systems.
Part IV considers the governance framework for ecosystem management through an examination of existing institutions, as currently
permitted and constrained by law. This part also examines potential
These institutions include innovative governance
institutions.
mechanisms such as compacts involving federal and state legislation
where power is shifted to regional organizations, interinstitutional
and intergovernmental mechanisms that improve ecosystem scale
coordination within existing power relationships, and emerging nongovernmental grass roots governance institutions. Part IV also
discusses the governance mechanisms recently proposed by federal
and state advisory groups to achieve ecosystem management in
South Florida. Part IV concludes with a discussion of other
potentially applicable governance mechanisms that would require
greater levels of institutional restructuring than suggested by current
proposals.

6. See infra notes 111-142 and accompanying text; see generally Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence,
Adaptive Management: Learningfrom the Columbia Basin Fish and Wildlife Program, 16 ENVTL. L.
431 (1984) (explaining adaptive management); Henry R. Lacey, New Hope for Pacific Salmon?, 3
HASTINGS W.-N.W. J. EwvTL. L. & POL'Y 19 (1995) (same).
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II. THE BOUNDARY CONUNDRUM

A. GeographicBoundaries:Defining the AppropriateManagement Unit
The revelation of ecosystem management, if it can be viewed as a
revelation, 7 stems from the realization that the rigid hierarchical
structure of the institutions previously developed to manage the
8
environment have ignored the spatial hierarchy of natural systems.
Our political and management institutions have not evolved along
the same lines as ecosystems. Thus, incongruence exists between the
legal and biotic boundaries. 9 Many argue that this fundamental
geographical disconnect has permitted ecosystem decline. 10 As a
result, government agencies, resource managers, and scientists are
rethinking how management hierarchies have evolved, in hopes of
11
better representing whole systems.
In a reconstructive effort, the United States Forest Service has
adopted a management approach described as the National Hierarchical Framework of Ecological Units, based on units referred to as
12
"Ecoregions," which enable evaluation of broad scale influences.
The United States Fish and Wildlife Service, on the other hand, is
looking to "watersheds" as the basic unit for implementing its own
view of ecosystem management. 13 In Florida, the DEP recently

7. The novelty of this revelation can be questioned. There is a volume of literature about
river basin administration discussing the concept of "institutional fragmentation" and its
effects on watershed management, including, to some extent, the management of water related
ecosystems. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. KENNEY & WILLIAM B. LORD, COORDINATION MECHANISMS
FOR THE CONTROL OF INTERSTATE WATER RESOURCES: A SYNTHESIS AND REVIEW OF THE
LITERATURE, TASK 2 REPORT: LITERATURE REVIEW (on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility,
University of Florida College of Law). Indeed, as these authors note, as early as the latter part
of the nineteenth century the famed explorer of the Colorado River and first head of the United
States Geological Survey advocated the concept of linking land and water institutions along
"hydrologic basins." Id. at 18 (citing J.W. POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION
OF THE UNITED STATES WITH A MORE DETAILED ACCOUNT OF THE LANDS OF UTAH, H.R. DOC.
No. 73, 45TH CONG., 2d Sess. (1878); J.W. Powell, Institutionsfor Arid Lands, XL THE CENTURY
111-16 (May-Oct. 1890)).

8. Robert B. Keiter, Beyond the Boundary Line: Constructinga Law of Ecosystem Management,
65 U. COLO. L. REV. 293, 296-301 (1994).

9. William D. Newmark, Legal and Biotic Boundaries of Western North American National
Parks:A Problemof Congruence, 33 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 197, 204 (1985).
10. STAFF OF HOUSE COMMITTEE ON NATURAL RESOURCES, 103D CONG., 2d Sess., ECOSYSTEM
MANAGEMENT: SUSTAINING THE NATION'S NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST 5-6 (1994) [hereinafter
NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST].

11. E.g., D. Scott Slocombe, Implementing Ecosystem-Based Management: Development of
Theory, Practice,and Researchfor Planningand Managing a Region, 43 BIOSCIENCE 612 (Oct. 1993).
12. U.S.D.A. FOREST SERVICE, NATIONAL HIERARCHICAL FRAMEWORK OF ECOLOGICAL UNITS
1 (1993).
13. U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, AN ECOSYSTEM APPROACH TO FISH AND WILDLIFE
CONSERVATION: AN APPROACH TO MORE EFFECTIVELY CONSERVE THE NATION'S BIODVERSITY 6
(1994). With regards to a definition for "watershed," one commentator stated that the
definition is unclear. Michael C. Blumm, Seven Myths of Northwest Water Law and Associated

Summer 1996]

ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT

announced an ecosystem management initiative based on the concept of "place" which is to succeed the previous media-based and
site-based systems. 14 Others have advanced theories of "greater
ecosystems," management units based on the spatial requirements of
large free-ranging mammals, 15 and "bioregionalism," a concept of
decentralized governance based loosely on biological and cultural
geography. 16 To some extent, however, these efforts simply replace
one boundary problem with another, because ecoregions, greater
ecosystems, bioregions, watersheds and places are not necessarily
coterminous. 17 In addition, these efforts oversimplify the ecological
and institutional complexities that abound in efforts to rethink
18
traditional resource management.
The spatial and temporal complexity and variability of ecosystems ensures that there can be no institutional mechanism that completely integrates the management of structure, components, and
functions of intact ecosystems. 19 Facile efforts to reconstruct the
geographical basis of resource management regimes may still not
achieve ecosystem management. In South Florida, for example,
hydrology is considered the defining characteristic of the Everglades
ecosystem. 20 An institution, the South Florida Water Management
District, illustrates this system's hydrologic boundaries. Moreover,
the District has existed for more than twenty years and has much of
the authority to manage the system, 21 yet scientists contend that the

Stories, 26 ENVrL. L. 141, 149 (1996). However, some commentators have attempted to define
"watershed." Watershed has been defined as "'[t]he entire surface drainage area that contributes water to a lake or river."' Robert W. Adler, Addressing Barriers to Watershed Protection, 25
ENVTL. L. 973, 975 (1995) (quoting COMMITTEE ON RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS,
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, RESTORATION OF AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS: SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY,
AND PUBLIC POLICY 524 (1992)). Another commentator defined watersheds to be the equilvalency of habitat zones. Sanford E. Gaines, Bridges to a Better Environment: Building Cross-Border
Institutionsfor Environment Improvement in the U.S.-Mexico Border Area, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 429,470 n.1 (1995).
14. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY: ACTION PLAN 4 (Ernie Barnett et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter FLORIDA
ACTION PLAN].
15. R. Edward Grumbine, ProtectingBiological Diversity Through the GreaterEcosystem Concept, 10 NATURAL AREAS 114-20 (1990).
16. KIRKPATRICK SALE, DWELLERS IN THE LAND: THE BIOREGIONAL VISION 44-48 (1985).
17. M. Lynne Corn, Ecosystems, Biomes and Watersheds: Definitions and Use, Cong. Res. Serv.
Rep. (ENR) No. 655, at 5-7 (uly 14, 1993).
18. See generally id. at 705-11.
19. Keiter, supranote 8, at 301-04 (describing ecosystems and limitations of agencies under
statutory law); R. EDWARD GRUMBINE, GHOST BEARS: EXPLORING THE BIODIVERSITY CRISIS 57-60
(1992) [hereinafter GHOST BEARS].
20. USMAB, supranote 5, at 103; U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN
FLORIDA PROJECT, RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY 111-12 (1994).
21. USMAB, supranote 5, at 104.
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Everglades system has been in a state of consistent decline throughout this period. 22
Even capturing an entire watershed, like the Everglades, within
the jurisdiction of a single resource agency with an ecosystem mandate would not necessarily resolve the dilemma posed by ecosystem
complexity. 23 Within the Everglades watershed, for example, the
Florida panther, a wide-ranging endangered species, disregards any
efforts to be pigeonholed into a hydrologic ecosystem classification
system. In the West, where the grizzly bear ranges across watersheds, this realization has led to the term "greater ecosystem." 24
Greater ecosystems have been defined as "self sustaining ecological
land units of a scale large enough to support and maintain viable
populations of large vertebrates and all the plant and animal species
native to the area." 25 A greater ecosystem that reflects the historic
range of a viable population of panthers in South Florida may not be
limited to the hydrologic boundaries of the Everglades watershed.
Unfortunately, even a greater ecosystem fails to capture the
ranges of migratory wildlife like the wading birds and neotropical
songbirds that inhabit South Florida during some portion of their
life. 2 6 Consequently, facile efforts to realign jurisdictional boundaries
along ecosystem lines, without far-reaching political and institutional
realignments, cannot bring about the sustainability goals of ecosystem management.
B. Institutional Boundaries
Ecosystem management fundamentally challenges the longstanding boundaries established to manage resources within and
across institutions. These boundaries, including those referred to as
"turf," 27 are often deeply imbedded in statutory directives, agency

22. See generally Stephen S. Light et a., The Everglades: Evolution of Management in a
Turbulent Ecosystem, in LANCE H. GUNDERSON ET AL., BARRIERS & BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF
ECOSYsTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 103,103-168 (1995).
23. See, e.g., J.A. Kushlan, Design and Management of Continental Wildlife Reserves: Lessons
From the Everglades, 15 BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION 281, 287-88 (1979).
24. GHOsT BEARS, supranote 19, at 57-60.
25. Mike Bader, The Northern Rockies Ecosystem ProtectionAct: A Citizen Plan for Wildlands
Management,17 WESTERN WILDLANDS 22 (1991).
26. Birds are the most numerous wildlife in the Everglades area; more than 220 species
reportedly use the habitat of the terrestrial and freshwater glades. In South Florida, about "60
percent of the bird species reported regularly" are migrating visitors or winter residents. N.
ScOTr SCHOMER & RICHARD D. DREW, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERVICE, OFFICE OF BIOLOGICAL
SERVICES, AN ECOLOGICAL CHARACrERIZATION OF THE LOWER EVERGLADES, FLORIDA BAY, AND

THE FLORIDA KEYS 137 (1982).
27. See Hanna Cortner, Intergovernmental Coordinationin Ecosystem Management: Status and
Potential- Summary of a Workshop Convened by the CongressionalResearch Service, Cong. Res. Serv.
Rep. 229-39 (Mar. 24-25, 1994).
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goals, missions and constituencies. 28 The classic and often-cited
example of a turf battle, that continues to have profound contemporary implications, can be found in the decision earlier this century to
include the Forest Service in the Department of Agriculture rather
than in the Department of Interior. Pitted as a battle between John
29
Muir's preservationists and Gifford Pinchot's wise conservationists,
the battle for the hearts and minds of the public lands managers continues to this day. Indeed, to some extent, ecosystem management
may be viewed as an end-of-the-century effort to finally reconcile
30
these two viewpoints under the mantle of ecological sustainability.
The deeply ingrained institutional biases that impede effective
ecosystem management have often developed from interpretations
or perceptions of the historical missions of resource management
agencies. 3 1 In the Pacific Northwest, for example, logging interests
have argued that certain turn-of-the-century commodity driven
statutory directives prohibit the implementation of ecosystem management. Lawsuits by the timber industry challenged the Clinton
administration's efforts to implement ecosystem management in the
Northwest. Complaints filed in federal court by the timber industry
alleged that the Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay
Wagon Road Lands Act subordinated all activities incompatible with
maximum sustained yield timber harvesting in the region, and hence
prohibited implementation of an ecosystem-based management
32
framework.
This philosophy, that new agency activities must be subordinated to previous directives, is not limited to Western lands or
timber. Perhaps the closest federal institutional and statutory analog
affecting South Florida can be found in the United States Army

28. Cf. NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST, supra note 10, at 6 (explaining that agencies are
reluctant to cooperate).
29. RODERICK NASH, WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND
30. NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST, supra note 10, at 7.

134-38 (1967).

31. Keiter, supra note 8, at 320-21.
32. The case of Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons was actually a group of consolidated cases
in which the timber industry and environmental groups challenged the legality of the forest
management plan adopted by the Secretaries of Agriculture and the Interior. Seattle Audubon
Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994). The case considered whether the
Secretary of the Interior acted within his discretion regarding public lands governed by the
Oregon and California Railroad and Coos Bay Wagon Road Lands Act (O&CLA) when designating part of the land as "late-successional and riparian reserves" and requiring retention of
certain "late-successional" forests not in reserved areas and 150-year rotation periods and
where O&CLA required lands be managed so that timber would be sold, cut and removed in
conformance with sustained yield principles. Id. The court determined that the Bureau of
Land Management had to fulfill conservation duties of other statutes and concluded that
O&CLA did not limit the Secretary's ability to take steps that would avoid both future listings
of species under ESA and additional disruptions in forest production. Id.
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Corps of Engineers (Corps) ecosystem management responsibilities.
An agency historically less likely to be charged with an ecosystem
management mandate than the Forest Service, the Corps is lodged in
an even more improbable Department: the Department of Defense. 33
A complete discussion of this improbable relationship follows.
1. DeconstructingFederal Projectsfor Ecosystem Purposes
Similar to the forests of the Northwest, the massive mid-century
public works projects, like the Central and Southern Florida Project,
are subject to claims of conflicting priorities. In South Florida, agricultural interests continue to argue that the authorizing legislation
for the Flood Control Project subordinates environmental protection
to flood control and water supply for agricultural and urban needs,
and even prohibits environmental restoration. This is the essence of
a challenge by the farming interests in South Dade County to the
Park Service's efforts to raise water levels in the C-111 canal to
improve water deliveries to the Everglades National Park's Taylor
Slough. 34 This theme was reiterated by farming interests in the Everglades Agricultural Area throughout the Everglades water quality
35
litigation.
Recent efforts at ecosystem restoration have also been affected by
the Corps' statutory mandate to develop economically viable projects. In South Florida, ecosystem restoration often means the deconstruction and reorientation of aspects of the Central and Southern
Florida Project, the massive plumbing system that has made South
Florida habitable for five million humans. 36 However, the Corps'
public works projects typically require a demonstration of economic
return on the public's investment, the so-called benefit-cost ratio.
While scientists have grappled for decades with a means to put
dollar figures on the environmental services provided by ecosystems,
the results are imprecise. As a result, major structural modifications
to the Central and Southern Florida Project for environmental
enhancement require a Congressional waiver from the net positive
economic effect requirement. This authority was recently provided

33. The Corps' reluctance to take on multiple purpose mandates has a long history which
dates back to the progressive movement at the end of the last century. See SAMUEL P. HAYS,
CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF EFFIcIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT

1890-1920 (1959).
34. South Dade Land Corp. v. Gordon Sullivan, 853 F. Supp. 404, 405 (S.D. Fla. 1993); see
also South Dade Land Corp. v. Gordon Sullivan, 155 F.R.D. 694, 695 (S.D. Fla. 1994).
35. See United States v. South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 1567, 1577 (S.D. Fla.
1992).
36. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 373.4592 (1995) (describing the most recent Everglades Program).
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by Subsection 903(c) of the Water Resources Development Act. 37
This has also been the case for the controversial Kissimmee River
restoration project, where cost overruns have trebled the costs of the
partial restoration it will achieve. As deconstruction projects become
increasingly comprehensive and expensive, it is likely that opponents of environmental restoration will become more critical of the
costs of maintaining ecosystems.
2. Institutional Culture and the Battlefor Turf
Even where institutions have determined to implement ecosystem management, differing agency conceptions of their missions
may perpetuate entrenched agency cultures and affect how they
actually perform ecosystem management. 38 For example, most recent definitions of ecosystem management contain some reference to
the importance of reconciling the interactions between humans and
the ecosystem. 39 The draft principles and guidelines for ecosystem
management offered by the White House Office of Environmental
Policy as guidance to agencies reinforce this definition. 40 Historically, federal multiple use agencies, such as the Forest Service
and the Bureau of Land Management, have embraced this reconciliation between humans and the environment. Resource protection

37. 16 U.S.C.A. § 410r-8(a)(3) (1996).
38. Grumbine, supra note 15, at 117; U.S. GEN. ACCr. OFF., PUB. No. GAO/RCED-94-111,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT: ADDITIONAL ACIONS NEEDED TO ADEQUATELY TEST A PROMISING
APPROACH 8 (1994) [hereinafter GAO/RCED-94-111].
39. R. Edward Grumbine, What is Ecosystem Management?, 8 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 27,
30-31 (1994) (listing the accommodation of human use and occupancy as one of the five specific
goals "frequently endorsed" as crucial to the success of ecosystem management); Keiter, supra
note 8, at 300 (stz-ting that "[e]ven the words 'ecosystem management' imply a merging of the
natural and human: 'ecosystem' implies a natural setting driven by natural processes, while
,management' implies a human presence and involvement in shaping the natural world. Ecosystem management, therefore, should not be viewed as a policy that omits human concerns
from the management equation.").
40. In 1993, the White House Office on Environmental Policy announced the establishment
of the Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force and requested $610 million for 1995
ecosystem management initiatives. Four pilot programs were initiated, which included a program aimed at restoring the ecological health of South Florida. Kevin J. Madonna, The Wolf in
North America: Defining InternationalEcosystems vs. Defining InternationalBoundaries, 10 J. LAND
USE & ENVTL. L. 305, 342 n.13 (1995). The Task Force "is chaired by the director of the [White
House] Office on Environmental Policy and consists of one assistant secretary from each of 12
federal departments and agencies, as well as one representative each from the Office of
Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology." J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity
Conservation and the Ever-Expanding Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for
Something Completely Different?, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 555, 575, 575 n.47 (1995). The Task force
subsequently published an overview on sustainable environments and healthy ecosystems. See
generally WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, INTERAGENCY ECOSYSTEM TASK
FORCE, HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS AND SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTS, VOLUME I - OVERVIEW (June
1995) [hereinafter HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS].
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agencies, such as the National Park Service and the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service, on the other hand, focus on a preservation
mandate. Conflicts between preservation and human use continue
to linger in public land management decisions.
In Florida too, institutional culture has affected either the nature
and extent of agency commitment to resource protection or the public's perception of that commitment. For example, the South Florida
Water Management District's legacy as the institutional successor to
the Central and Southern Florida Flood Control District and Everglades Drainage District continues to survive and affect public perception of its mandate. Moreover, the merger between the Florida
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) and the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation that created the DEP caused
-potential internal agency conflict over mandate and a concern that
the new agency might inherit the land management agency's personality. In addition, some critics believe that the Florida Game and
Fresh Water Fish Commission (GFWFC) remains inordinately tied to
the limited hunting and fishing mandate its name implies, despite a
41
broader constitutional mandate to protect all wildlife.
Finally, questions of mission and turf can profoundly affect the
nature and extent of interagency and intergovernmental coordination, vital to ecosystem management. 42 Operating in a highly
charged political environment, and sensitive to managerial discretion, agencies have been reluctant to become involved in the plans
and proposals of sister agencies. 43 One example of this institutional
behavior was the difficulty in uniting federal agencies within the
Department of Interior and the Department of Agriculture with the
Corps in the politically charged Everglades water quality litigation,

41. See generally Game Commission Faultedon Protection of Wildlife, MIAMI HERALD, May 28,
1991, at 8B; Karl Vick, Black Bears as Targets and Road Kill Series: Column One, ST. PETERSBURG
TIMES, May 21, 1993, at 1A; see also infra note 58. The GFWFC was granted authority over fish
and wildlife of the state and property of the state in an amendment to the 1885 Florida
Constitution in 1942; this constitutional revision left the entire administrative structure of the
GFWFC to be determined by the Legislature. The 1942 amendment authorized the Legislature
to enact statutes which conferred upon the GFWFC the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations to carry into effect its powers. FLA. CONST. art. IV § 9.
42. See Joseph L. Sax & Robert B. Keiter, Glacier National Park and its Neighbors: A Study of
Federal Interagency Relations, 14 ECOLoGY L.Q. 207, 222, 259-60 (1987).
43. William J. Lockart, External Park Threats and Interior's Limits: The Needfor an Independent
Park Service, in OUR COMMON LANDS: DEFENDING THE NATIONAL PARKS 3, 18-21 (David J.
Simon ed., 1988); Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on
Public Lands, 25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43,48 (1990); NATURAL RESOURCES TRUST, supra note 10,
at 6.
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particularly when it entailed the Corps becoming a plaintiff against
the South Florida Water Management District.44
The relation between federal and state agencies brings with it the
historical baggage of comity and federalism. The Everglades water
quality litigation was also viewed by some as a federal power grab,
derailing a state planning process that would have achieved the
same result sought by federal litigation.45 Regardless of the validity
of these assertions, perception can be as important an obstacle to
achieving ecosystem management through intergovernmental coordination as reality.
C. Boundariesand Ecosystem Management in Florida
1. Devolution, Delegation, Deference, Consolidation, Co-location and
Cooperation:The InstitutionalLanguage of Ecosystem Management in
Florida
In Florida, the boundary conundrum in ecosystem management
has been somewhat simplified by ongoing institutional processes
that began prior to the emergence of ecosystem management as a
governmental management paradigm. In 1972, Florida was divided
along hydrologic boundaries into regional water management districts which were later placed under the general supervision of the
newly created State Department of Environmental Regulation. 46 In
1993, the Florida Environmental Reorganization Act (Reorganization
Act) consolidated the State's land management agency, the DNR,
with its environmental regulatory agency, the Department of Environmental Regulation, to form the Department of Environmental
Protection (DEP).47 The DEP continues to exercise supervisory
authority over the water management districts and has created
regional offices that conform geographically and are co-located with
the water management districts. 48
In addition, the Reorganization Act consolidated several regulatory actions; for example, the dredge and fill and surface water management permits were merged into a single environmental resource

44. The South Florida Water Management District was apparently an agency with which
the Corps enjoyed good relations; the Corps had supervisory control over the project and
actual responsibility for the water pumps inivolved, but was not consulted before this lawsuit
was filed. Dewitt John, Leadership in the Everglades: The Politics of Restoring an Ecosystem, in
CMc ENVIRONMENTALISM: ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION IN STATES AND COMMUNITIES 147,
156-58 (1993).
45. Id. at 147-49.
46. FLA. STAT. § 373.069 (1995); see also Ronald A. Christaldi, Sharing the Cup: A Proposalfor
the Allocation of Florida'sWater Resources, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 1996).
47. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-213, (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 20.255 (1995)).
48. FLA. STAT. § 403.809(1) (1995).
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permit (ERP).4 9 Statutory authority for implementation of the permitting program devolved directly to the water management districts. 50 While these concurrent efforts to consolidate and delegate
environmental management to geographically decentralized institutions caused consternation among environmentalists who prefer
multiple checks on resource decisions, the efforts were consistent
with ecosystem management's goal of holistic and decentralized
51
management at the most geographically appropriate level.
The delegation of regulatory and land management authority to
the appropriate level of government is a key recommendation of
DEl's recent ecosystem management initiative. 5 2 The 1993 legislation also authorized the DEP to develop rules for regional mitigation
banks to offset the effects of development activities under its
regulatory jurisdiction. 53 This legislation requires DEP and the water
management districts to consider cumulative impacts in ruling on
permits,54 which one commentator considers the key to meaningful
ecosystem management. 55 Thus, at the state level, Florida appears to
be moving its institutions in a direction that addresses both the
geographical and institutional boundary conundrums of ecosystem
management; however, significant gaps remain.
One such gap is in the protection of upland wildlife habitat. The
"comprehensive" environmental resource permit only regulates
impacts to aquatic and wetlands-dependent species from the construction and operation of surface water management systems and
activities in wetlands.5 6 Although the Florida GFWFC has a broad
constitutional mandate to protect wildlife, it has, until recently,
largely limited its activities to the regulation of hunting and fishing
and the direct taking of protected species. It has declined to follow
57
the controversial lead of the United States Fish and Wildlife Service

49. FLA. STAT. § 373.427 (1995). The DEP adopted certain rules of the water management
districts to implement the new ERPs. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-330 (1994).
50. FLA. STAT. § 373.441 (1995).
51. See, e.g., FLORIDA ACION PLAN, supra note 14, at 24-25.
52. Id. at 22.
53. FLA. STAT. § 373.4135 (1995).
54. Id. § 373.414(8).
55. Keiter, supra note 43, at 50.
56. FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 62-330 (1994).
57. Through the authority of section 7(a)(2), 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (1994), of the
Endangered Species Act, the Secretary of the Fish and Wildlife Service defined "harm" broadly
to include habitat modification. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1995). The validity of this broad definition of
harm was upheld by the United States Supreme Court. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S. Ct. 2407 (1995). For a full discussion of the history of
this issue, see Steven G. Davison, Alteration of Wildlife Habitat as a Prohibited Taking Under the
Endangered Species Act, 10 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 155 (1995), and A. Kimberly Rockwell, The
Fifth Amendment Implications of Including Habitat Modification in the Definition of Harm to
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and regulate the destruction of habitat.5 8 In addition, Florida lacks
the regulatory tools that would encourage the development of habitat conservation plans authorized by federal endangered species
59
legislation.
Florida's approach to upland habitat protection has developed
primarily through an ambitious land acquisition scheme that targets
environmentally sensitive lands, and a statewide "Greenways" initiative under the auspices of the DEP that utilizes wildlife corridor
theory from conservation biology as one of its organizing principles. 60 Recent advances in mapping technology along with the
development of scientifically based reserve design parameters suggested by biologists have permitted planners to target and prioritize
acquisition efforts. 61 In addition, pilot projects involving incentivebased cooperative efforts on private lands, including a large scale
initiative to conserve the Florida Panther habitat in Southwest
Florida, contribute to Florida's developing upland ecosystem
62
management planning framework.

Endangered Species (Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 115 S.
Ct. 2407 (1995)), 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 573 (1996).
58. The authority of the GFWFC to protect habitat in addition to protecting individual
animals has been challenged. See Kathleen L. Blizzard, The Gopher Tortoise Incidental Takings
Rule, in WILDLIFE, HABITAT AND LAND USE: FLORIDA'S DEVELOPING Zoo 8.15-8.18 (1991). This
may be a manifestation of an agency culture. The GFWFC has historically focused on recreational hunting and fishing as its primary mandate, but has authority to regulate more broadly
as well. See generally FLA. STAT. § 372 (1995). In contrast, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service is
currently advocating ecosystem management. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, supra note
13. However, public access to the decision making of the GFWFC could make a difference, and
the Florida Chamber of Commerce recently supported amending Florida's Administrative
Procedure Act to extend its provisions to the GFWFC. Sally Bond Mann, A Symposium on the
FloridaAdministrative ProcedureAct, Reforming the APA: Legislative Adventures in the Labyrinth, 22
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 307,319 (1994).
59. The ESA prohibits federal agency action that jeopardizes the existence of threatened or
endangered species or that adversely affects the critical habitats of these species. However,
some takings otherwise banned are possible under section 10(a) of the ESA which provides for
incidental taking permits from the Fish and Wildlife Service if the taking is only incidental to
an otherwise lawful activity. Applications for these permits must include a Habitat Conservation Plan (HCP). The approval process for the incidental taking permit is demanding.
The FWS is concerned only that the species not be jeopardized by the effects of the proposed
activity, and does not consider the need for development. See generally C. Anthony Arnold,
Conserving Habitats and Building Habitats: The Emerging Impact of the Endangered Species Act on
Land Use Development, 10 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 1 (1991); see also The Endangered Species Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994). CompareFLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 39-27.002 (1995).
60. FLORIDA GREENWAYS COMMISSION, CREATING A STATEWIDE GREENWAYS SYSTEM: FOR
PEOPLE, FOR WILDLIFE, FOR FLORIDA, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR 17-18 (Dec. 1994).
61. JAMES COX Er AL., FLORIDA GAME & FRESH WATER FISH COMM'N, CLOSING THE GAPS IN
FLORIDA'S WILDLIFE HABITAT CONSERVATION SYSTEM 1,33 (1994).
62. 1995, Fla. Laws ch. 95-275. "Florida supports the only population of panthers remaining in the eastern U.S." Cox, supra note 61, at 3. The greater Everglades ecosystem, in its
present state, appears to be simply too small to maintain a genetically diverse and sufficiently
populous deme of Florida panthers. William B. Robertson & Peter C. Frederick, The Faunal
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Another significant gap is the weakness of the linkages between
land and water management. 63 Local governments in Florida have
comprehensive responsibility for planning and regulating land use,
with limited oversight by the Florida Department of Community
Affairs and regional planning councils. Although local governments
are required to be consistent with the state comprehensive plan and
strategic regional policy plans prepared by the State's Regional Planning Councils, there is no requirement that plans preserve ecosystem
functions or that they be consistent with the regional plans of the
water management districts. 64 In addition, regional planning councils reflect the political boundaries of counties, contributing to the
institutional complexity of consolidating land and water planning
within ecosystems.
Recommendations have recently been put forward to strengthen
the relation between land use decisionmaking and water management planning. A state task force has suggested requiring consistency between the strategic regional policy plans of the regional
planning councils and the water management district plans. 65 More
recently, the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida
has made similar recommendations with regard to local government
plans.66 The effectiveness of these reforms would depend on the
quality and specificity of the plans and the degree to which consistency between regional strategic plans, water management district
plans, and local plans can be achieved.

Chapters: Contexts, Synthesis, and Departures,in EVERGLADES: THE ECOSYSTEM AND ITS RESTORATION 709, 726-27 (Steven M. Davis & John C. Ogden eds., 1994). Recovery of the Florida Panther will require habitat protection on private lands. FLORIDA GAME AND FRESHWATER FISH
COMMISSION, FLORIDA PANTHER HABITAT PROTECTION PLAN: SOUTH FLORIDA POPULATION
(1993); David S. Maehr & James A. Cox, Landscape Featuresand Patterns in Florida, 9 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 1008-19,1018 (1995).
63. FLORIDA LAND USE & WATER PLANNING TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE LAND
USE & WATER PLANNING TASK FORCE, FINAL REPORT 1 (Dec. 1994). This task force, commonly
known as the Tschinkel Commission after its Chairperson Victoria Tschinkel, previously the
Secretary of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, was established pursuant to
section 77 of chapter 93-206, Laws of Florida. Id. at Appendix [hereinafter Tschinkel Commission Recommendations]. The mandate for the Commission to make recommendations on
water policy to the Florida Legislature is codified. FLA. STAT. §§ 403.031, 373.019 (1995). Because of the various planning agencies involved in Florida governance, there is a distinct need
for a coordinated regional approach. See also GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION FOR A SUSTAINABLE
SOUTH FLA., INITIAL REPORT 158 (Oct. 1995) [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION].
64. See generally FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3161-.163.3243 (1995) (titled "Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land Development Regulation Act").
65. Tschinkel Commission Recommendations, supra note 63, at 1-3.
66. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 63, at 43-45.
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2. Re"placing" the Boundary Line
Efforts are now underway in Florida to directly address the ecosystem management boundary conundrum. The Reorganization Act
requires the DEP to protect entire ecological functions through coordination of regulatory and planning programs as well as through
land acquisitions. 67 Seizing on this statutory mandate, the DEP
recently launched an ecosystem management initiative by establishing partnerships with private interests and other agencies while
emphasizing research, education, communication, and coordination
with existing authorities. 68 The result of DEP's effort is its Ecosystem
Management Implementation Strategy and Action Plan (Action
Plan).69 The Action Plan addresses both the geographical and institutional boundary issues in ecosystem management. It centers on
the development of a new geographical approach, termed "placebased management." 70 Place-based management appears to be an
effort to move towards ecologically determined geographic boundaries, such as watersheds, as the basis for environmental management. The DEP approach will create a statewide framework of
Ecosystem Management Areas (EMAs) "big enough to allow major
hydrological and ecological connections to be addressed on a regional scale." 71 An appendix to the Action Plan provides evaluation
criteria for establishing EMAs, and offers a tentative geographic
delineation of EMAs throughout the state. 72 From the boundary
standpoint, a key evaluation criteria is the avoidance of jurisdictional
overlap. Accordingly, the Action Plan has attempted to conform
EMAs to DEP district and water management district boundaries
where possible. However, there is no discussion of reconfiguring
DEP's administrative structure to conform to the EMA management
unit. Instead, the emphasis remains on cooperation and coordina73
tion across non-conforming boundaries.
In South Florida, the DEP proposal would create two EMAs
within the boundaries of the South Florida Water Management
District. A South Florida EMA is subdivided for management into
three subregions: (1) the Greater Kissimmee River and Lake Okeechobee; (2) Loxahatchee/Hungryland Slough and Allapattah Flats;

67. 1993, Fla. Laws ch. 93-213 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 20.255 (1995)).
68. See FLORIDA ACTION PLAN, supra note 14.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 6.
71. Id. at 8.
72. FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, EcosysrEM MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY: VOL. II - APPENDICES (Sept. 1995).
73. Id. at 11-4, V-1.
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and (3) the Greater Everglades. 74 The Florida Keys are a separate
EMA. The DEP recommends deferring EMA management to the
South Florida Water Management District and other current ecosystem initiatives underway in the EMA. 75 In addition, legislative
authority establishes Florida Bay as an ecosystem management case
76
study under DEP's direction.
Two other major efforts to coordinate ecosystem management are
underway in South Florida. As one of four pilot projects in ecosystem management, the Clinton administration established an Interagency Task Force on the South Florida Ecosystem, chaired by the
Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks within the
Department of Interior. The Task Force includes representatives
from the Departments of Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, the Army
77
(Civil Works), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
An Interagency Working Group of local agency representatives was
also created to assist the task force in developing "consistent policies,
strategies, plans, programs and priorities for addressing the concerns
of the South Florida ecosystem." 78
The other major effort at intergovernmental and interest group
coordination is the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South
Florida, composed of thirty-five voting members representing all of
the state, regional, and local agencies involved in the management of
growth in South Florida, as well as representatives of major interest
groups. 79 In addition, there are five non-voting federal representatives. The Commission is charged with numerous tasks, including a
review of existing planning and regulatory programs affecting the
Everglades ecosystem and recommending strategies for improved
management. Each of these groups is formulating policies and plans
to coordinate activities across institutional boundaries. These are
discussed in greater detail in Part IV which addresses ecosystem
governance.
D. ProceduralBoundaries

Beyond the problems associated with defining the geographically
appropriate management unit and changing ingrained institutional
behavior resulting from conflicting legislative directives and agency

74. Id. at V-38.
75. Id. at V-44.
76. See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.4593(4), 373.4592(b), 373.4592(f) (1995).
77. U.S. DEP'T. OF INTERIOR, INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT ON SOUTH FLORIDA ECOSYSTEM

RESTORATION (Sept. 1993) [hereinafter INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT].
78. SOUTH FLORIDA ECOSYSTEM RESTORATION WORKING GROUP, 1994 ANNUAL REPORT iv
(1994) [hereinafter WORKING GROUP ANNUAL REPORT].
79. Fla. Exec. Order No. 94-54 (Mar. 3,1994).
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culture, Congress and state legislatures have, sometimes inadvertently, erected procedural boundaries which confound efforts to implement coordinated ecosystem management. Perhaps the most controversial of these has been the Federal Advisory Committee Act.80
Critics contend that this once obscure statute inhibits the ability of
federal agencies to participate in intergovernmental coordination
efforts without complying with onerous procedural requisites. It has
been successfully applied to stymie ecosystem level intergovernmental coordination in the Pacific Northwest. 81 Recent statutory
amendments have improved its utility in intergovernmental ecosystem management coordination efforts, however. 82 In addition,
federal budgetary restrictions have been observed to hinder ecosystem management. 83
Finally, procedural requirements for long-range planning by
multiple agencies and governments with jurisdiction in a single ecosystem inhibit coordinated management. 84 For example, the National Park Service, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration all share land
management jurisdiction of the Everglades ecosystem in South
Florida, yet all develop separate plans, at different times and with
sometimes disparate objectives. Planning horizons differ significantly among state and local agencies as well. 85 At the same time,
Congress has authorized the Corps to undertake a complete restudy
of the Central and Southern Florida Project in an effort to make it
more responsive to the current ecological crisis. 86 Yet the State and
federal government have already agreed to massive structural alterations in the Project to settle recent water quality litigation that may

80. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 14 (1994).
81. Id. at §§ 14(b)-(c) (requiring that advisory committees not take any action until after
filing a charter, even when renewing the charter; charter renewal is frequent and is required
every two years for committees created by Congressional mandate); e.g., Seattle Audubon
Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1308-10 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (finding that FEMAT violated
the Federal Advisory Committee Act).
82. The Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force, a national task force established
in August 1993 in response to Vice President Gore's National Performance Review, commented
on this. HEALTHY EcosysTEMs, supra note 40, at 10 (referring to the Unfunded Mandates
Reform Act, 2 U.S.C. § 1534 (1994)).
83. Id. at 12 (making recommendations to improve allocations); see also NATURAL
REsouRcEs TRUST, supra note 10, at 8.
84. GAO/RCED-94-111, supra note 38, at 8.
85. The Governor's Commission estimated that there are approximately 200 plans addressing water issues in South Florida. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 63, at 158.
86 16 U.S.C.A. § 410r-8 (1996).
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inhibit redesign flexibility. 87 Emergency responses to single issues
that arise within the watershed present the Corps with moving
targets in the context of its efforts to achieve ecosystem level
rehabilitation of the Project.
1. The "Common Law" of Ecosystem Management and Environmental
Federalism

Certain statutes can cut across the boundaries of agency jurisdiction to encourage interagency and intergovernmental coordination in
support of ecosystem management objectives, where other substantive law permits. This is particularly true at the federal level where
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 88 and the Endangered Species Act (ESA) 89 each invoke consultation procedures that
cross agency jurisdictional boundaries and intergovernmental coordination.90 The Federal Coastal Zone Management Act has also been
cited as a cross-cutting interagency, intergovernmental coordination
mechanism which may provide an appropriate model for ecosystem
management. 91 Taken together, these statutes, as well as other federal land management statutes, may be described as creating an
emerging common law of ecosystem management. 92 There is continuing interest in revising each of these statutes to better reflect
principles of ecosystem management. 93 Moreover, to the extent that
entrenched agency culture frustrates implementation of ecosystem
management, mechanisms exist within these statutes for citizen
enforcement of their provisions either directly or through the
Administrative Procedures Act.94
The opportunities to inject ecosystem-based considerations into
decisionmaking that cross-cutting federal process statutes like NEPA
and the consultation provisions of the ESA provide are threatened by

87. United States v. South Florida Water Management Dist., et al., No. 88-1886-CIVHOEVELER (S.D. Fla. 1991) (memorandum opinion and order entering settlement agreemnet
as consent decree).
88. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(d) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
89. The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994).
90. See, e.g., Keiter, supra note 43, at 46-60.
91. Cortner, supra note 27, at 229-30.
92. See generally Keiter, supra note 43 (explaining that statutes like NEPA cut across the
boundaries, requiring all agencies to comply with its procedures).
93. Ruhl, supra note 40, at 648-60; Cynthia Carlson, NEPA and the Conservation of Biological
Diversity, 19 ENVTL. L. 15, 23-36 (1988) (discussing revisions necessary for the protection of
biodiversity); cf. Julie B. Bloch, Preserving Biological Diversity in the United States: The Case for
Moving to an Ecosystems Approach to Protect the Nation's Biological Wealth, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
175, 217-25 (1992) (advocating passage of an Ecosystems Protection Act).
94. See, e.g., The Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994); see The Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-576 (1994).
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a process that goes to the heart of the federal environmental regulatory system. Congress designed most substantive federal environmental regulatory programs, like the Clean Water Act and the Clean
Air Act, to eventually be assumed by the states. This is compatible
with the ideal of implementing ecosystem management at the most
appropriate level. However, the inter-agency coordination and review functions provided by NEPA and the consultation provisions of
the ESA require federal action to trigger them. These coordination
tools may be lost where the federal government delegates away substantive federal programs and hence does away with the opportunity
for NEPA and ESA review.95 For example, Florida is aggressively
pursuing assumption of the federal government's water quality
permitting programs, administered by the EPA and the Corps. Yet
Florida lies in the minority of states that have no cross-cutting comprehensive NEPA-like review of proposed activities that may affect
the environment. Moreover, Florida lacks the strong citizen enforcement mechanisms that federal law provides, and maintains a restric96
ted regulatory approach for the protection of endangered species.
E. Conclusion

The boundary conundrum in ecosystem management remains its
most perplexing dimension. The open and fluid nature of ecological
systems juxtaposed against the rigidity and imperfection of human
institutions virtually assures that the conundrum will remain unresolved. Nevertheless, it seems equally clear that measures can be
and have been taken to reduce the complexities caused by non-conforming geographical and institutional boundaries. In Florida, this
task was greatly simplified by the presence of a 1972 law which
divided management of resources considered most critical to ecosystem management among institutions whose boundaries are aligned
to reflect those resources. 97 In South Florida this may yet prove to be

95. See John W. Steiger, The Consultation Provisionof Section 7(a)(2) of the Endangered Species
Act and Its Application to Delegable FederalPrograms, 21 EcOLOGY L.Q. 243, 292-96 (1994).
96. Florida does, however, have some laws which protect the life of the endangered species
itself; the Florida panther, for example, is protected by section 372.671, FloridaStatutes. Tina L.
Morin, Note, Indians,Non-Indians, and the Endangered Panther;Will the Indian/Non-Indian Conflict
be Resolved Before the PantherDisappears?,13 PUB. LAND L. REV. 167,167 (1992). Florida also has
laws which provide certain administrative agencies, such as the water management districts,
the authority to implement a certain amount of habitat protection for these species in wetlands.
See FLA. STAT. §§ 373.413, 373.414(1)(A)2 (1995); supranotes 58-59 and accompanying text.
97. In 1972, the Florida Legislature passed "four landmark pieces of legislation... that had
a profound effect on regional management." Light, supra note 22, at 133-34. See generally,
LUTHER CARTER, THE FLORIDA EXPERIENCE: LAND AND WATER POLICY INA GROWrH STATE 12537 (1974). One of these, the Water Resources Act, established regional water districts which
received jurisdiction over environmental protection under chapter 373, FloridaStatutes. Id.
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particularly fortuitous. More recent legislative and administrative
reforms, as well as proposals being offered by federal and state advisory bodies, also support the objectives of devolution, delegation,
and deference to the most appropriate management unit, while the
corresponding processes of consolidation, coordination, and co-location signal a move toward a more holistic approach to resource management. Despite these promising actions, the long-standing reluctance of resource agencies to cede authority within and among
sovereigns, coupled with the historical baggage that agencies bring
98
with them, threaten efforts to achieve ecosystem-level governance.
III. CONFRONTING UNCERTAINTY: SCIENCE, THE LAW AND ADAPTIVE
MANAGEMENT IN THE EVERGLADES ECOSYSTEM

Ecosystem science remains a complex discipline fraught with
uncertainties. 99 Indeed, it might be argued that the only constant for
ecologists is change. 00° Most of the frequently referenced ecosystem
management principles address the problem of uncertainty by encouraging managers to go forward with the best available scientific
knowledge and to embrace uncertainty by adopting a strategy referred to as "adaptive management." 1°1 This appears to be the
approach resource managers have selected for South Florida. The
system-wide restudy of the Central and Southern Florida Project,
under direction of the Corps, acknowledges fundamental ecological
uncertainties in what a restored Everglades ecosystem should look
like; hence, uncertainties in how a new management system should
be designed. 10 2 Adaptive management offers a convenient tool
to confront these uncertainties.
However, both the law and

98. See, e.g., Kai N. Lee & Jody Lawrence, Restoration Under the Northwest Power Act,
Adaptive Management:Learningfrom the Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program,16 ENVTL.
L. 431,439 n.33 (1986).
99. See, e.g., Mark A. Harwell & Christine C. Harwell, Environmental Decision Making in the
Presence of Uncertainty, in ECOTOXICOLOGY: PROBLEMS AND APPROACHES 517, 524-32 (Simon A.
Levin et al. eds., 1989) (categorizing the sources of ecological uncertainties).
100. Donald Worster, The Ecology of Order and Chaos, 14 ENVTL. HISTORY REV. 7, 13 (1990).
A favorite quotation of conservation biologists is that "ecosystems are not only more complex
than we think, but more complex than we can think." Reed F. Noss, Some Principlesof Conservation Biology, as They Apply to Environmental Law, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893, 898 (1994); see also
Judy L. Meyer, The Dance of Nature: New Concepts in Ecology, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 875, 875-84
(1994).
101. See, e.g., Grumbine, supra note 39; Lee & Lawrence, supra note 98, at 434-42.
102. CENTRAL AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS., RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW STUDY 108-09 (1994) [hereinafter C&SF RECONNAISSANCE REPORT].
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sociopolitical factors may confound
10 3
management on an ecosystem scale.

efforts to apply adaptive

A. Scientific Uncertaintyand the Law
The admonition to use the best science available serves as a reminder to scientists and resource managers that they do not operate
in a vacuum, and must engage in some level of reasoned guess work
to advance the decisionmaking process. This attribute of science has
been best explained by Professor Latin in the introduction to his 1982
essay on the law and scientific uncertainty as follows:
When confronted by uncertainty in the course of a scientific
investigation, the systematic response of a scientist is suspension of
judgment pending the acquisition of more data and the development of testable hypotheses. In science, 'no decision' can mean just
that. In legal disputes, however, 'no decision' perpetuates the
status quo and ordinarily promotes some interests at the expense of
others. Lacking a comparable option to suspend the flow of events,
of, or
legal decisionmakers must often create public policy in spite
104
in light of, the absence of reasonable scientific consensus.
The law tends to encourage regulatory inaction in the face of
uncertainty. 10 5 The application of legal devices relating to standard
of review and burden of proof in regulatory proceedings support this
view. 106 In the context of the development of environmental policy,
the standard of review refers to the statutory guidelines by which
agencies implement policy through agency action. For example, the
Florida Administrative Procedures Act requires that agencies demonstrate that their regulatory activities, known as rules and orders,
are not "arbitrary or capricious." 10 7 Yet where uncertain outcomes
are likely, the likelihood of legal arbitrariness may increase commensurately. For example, if an agency wished to test a particular management strategy, such as altering a regulation schedule at a water
control structure to test the downstream effects on water quality, it

103. See Rebecca W. Thomson, Ecosystem Management: Great Idea, But What Is It, Will It
Work, and Who Will Pay?, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 42, 70-71 (Winter 1995).
104. Howard A. Latin, The "Significance" of Toxic Health Risks: An Essay on Legal Decisionmaking Under Uncertainty, 10 ECOLOGY L.Q. 339, 339 (1982); see also A. Dan Tarlock, The Nonequilibrium Paradigm in Ecology and the Partial Unraveling of Environmental Law, 27 LOy. L.A. L.
REV. 1121, 1133 (1994).
105. Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking the Wrong Questions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking,15 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 327,354-56 (1991).
106. Id. at 364-82.
107. FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8)(e) (1995). The 1996 Florida Legislature significantly weakened
the authority of agencies to rely on incipient policy. 1996, Fla. Laws ch. 96-159 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 120.57(1)(e)).
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may be subject to attack on the grounds that the action is arbitrary
since the effects are unknown. 108 To mitigate some of the hardship
posed by the demand for certainty, administrative and environmental law doctrines have developed which require deference to
agency science and incorporate wide error margins into the assessment of risk. 10 9 More recently, a normative framework known as the
precautionary principle has emerged in international environmental
law that shifts the burden of proof in the face of scientific uncertainty
to those proposing activities which might adversely affect the
environment. 110
B. Adaptive Management

Proponents of ecosystem management have recognized the
dilemma presented by scientific uncertainty in the management
context and embraced the principle of adaptive management. Indeed, virtually every collection of domestic ecosystem management
principles, however varied, explicitly incorporates adaptive management as a guiding principle. 111 Florida is no exception. Both DEP
and the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida
strongly endorse the principle. 112 Adaptive management also appears to underlie a major non-governmental initiative in South
Florida.113 In addition, the Corps' Comprehensive Review Study

108. However, in Florida law, a mechanism that gives agencies some latitude in policy
making is the so-called doctrine of "incipient policy." McDonald v. Department of Banking &
Finance, 346 So. 2d 569, 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). This legal theory arose from the recognition
that all agency action cannot be predetermined by rules or orders. Agencies must have some
carefully controlled flexibility to implement programs within the interstices of statutes. The
legal doctrine which considers cumulative impacts in wetlands when permitting first emerged
in this context and was subsequently codified. See Thomas T. Ankersen, Cumulative Impacts in
Florida Environmental Decisionmaking: Finding the Straw That Breaks the Camel's Back (And
Equitably DistributingAll the Others), 60 FLA. B. J.21, 25 (Mar. 1986).
109. Tarlock, supra note 104, at 1135-37.
110. James Cameron & Juli Abouchar, The PrecautionaryPrinciple:A FundamentalPrincipleof
Law and Policy for the Protection of the Global Environment, 14 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 21
(1991); Bernard A. Weintraub, Science, International Environmental Regulation, and the Precautionary Principle:Setting Standards and Defining Terms, 1 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. J. 173 (1992).
111. The dominant themes of ecosystem management espoused by commentators and
agencies are collected in Grumbine, supranote 39, at 30.
112. FLA. DEPT. OF ENVTL. PROTECTION, BEGINNING ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT 4 (Apr.
1994); GOVERNOR'S COMIMN FOR A SUSTAINABLE SOUTH FLA., INITIAL REPORT 47-48 (Oct. 1995)
(stating that "[flederal, state, and regional agencies and local governments should apply principles of adaptive management in their planning and implementation activities to maintain
flexibility and to incorporate the results of previous actions).
113. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation has based a multiyear, interdisciplinary effort for sustainability in the Everglades on the application of complex adaptive
systems theory. Telephone Interview with Mathew S. Sexton, The Conservation Fund (uly 2,
1996), John Cleveland and Pete Plastrik, Developing a Systemic Approach to Sustainability in
the Everglades (March 1995) (unpublished paper prepared for the Conservation Fund).
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assumes that South Florida ecosystem restoration would be implemented in accordance with an adaptive management strategy, but
defers delineating the details of such a strategy to a subsequent
114
phase.
Adaptive management recognizes scientific uncertainty as an
essential assumption in resource policy development." 5 Adaptive
management suggests that ecosystem management, including ecosystem management policy, should take place in incremental but
reversible steps, or probes, designed to test hypotheses concerning
appropriate management techniques." 6 For proponents of adaptive
management, outcomes become less important than the knowledge
gained from them. One commentator stated, "surprises are opportunities to learn rather than failures to predict." 117 Adaptive management moved from the laboratory to center stage in the ecosystem
management debate when scholars suggested explicitly incorporating social and political factors into adaptive decisions. 118 Its application in resource management has been pioneered in an applied
context in the Pacific Northwest by the Northwest Power Planning
Council, a regional compact entity, with efforts to reconcile the
restoration of Salmon with hydropower development." 9 More recently, adaptive management has emerged as a management strategy in efforts to undertake multispecies habitat conservation planning
in Southern California, as well as in efforts to reconcile biodiversity
protection with timber harvesting in the Pacific Northwest and the
120
Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.

114. C&SF RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at 114.
115. Tarlock, supranote 104, at 1139-44.
116. INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS, ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMEN-

TAL ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT 25-56 (C.S. Holling ed., 1978) [hereinafter ADAPTIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT]; Carl Walters, ADAPTIVE MANAGEMENT OF RENEWABLE RE-

SOURCES vii-viii (1986); Kai N. Lee, DeliberatelySeeking Sustainability in the Columbia River Basin,
in BARRIERS AND BRIDGES TO THE RENEWAL OF ECOSYSTEMS AND INSTITUTIONS 214, 228-30 (Lance
H. Gunderson et al. eds., 1995).
117. Lee, supra note 116, at 229.
118. ADAPTIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, supra note 116, at 2-7; John M. Volkman &
Willis E. McConnaha, Through a Glass, Darkly: Columbia River Salmon, The EndangeredSpecies Act,
and Adaptive Management, 23 ENvTL. L. 1249,1256-57 (1993).
119. See Lee & Lawrence, supra note 98, at 432-40; Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 118,
at 1254-58; KAI N. LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLITICS FOR THE

ENVIRONMENT 49-51 (1993); Lee, supra note 116, at 214-38.
120. Tarlock, supra note 104, at 1141-44 (explaining California's plan for "large scale,
multispecies equivalents" of habitat conservation plans authorized by the Endangered Species
Act and the southern California pilot project in the coastal scrub sage); see also Seattle Audubon
Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291, 1304-06 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (describing adaptive management use in 1994 federal plan in the Pacific Northwest); see also infra notes 315-24 and
accompanying test (explaining the activities concerning the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem).
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Adaptive management has also been described as a radical doctrine, since it encourages experimenting with resources at ecosystem
or population-level scales. 121 For example, in fisheries management,
it has been applied to deliberately over-harvest or under-harvest fish
populations. 122 Both the law and politics may confound a manager's
ability to apply this radical doctrine, as case studies from the Pacific
Northwest and South Florida demonstrate.
1. The Everglades Nutrient Removal Project-An Adaptive Management Case Study
Adaptive management, a means to deal with uncertainty in
decisionmaking, may be affected by the burden of proof in environmental and administrative law. 123 For example, the South Florida
Water Management District recently developed an experimental program designed to treat nutrient-laden agricultural stormwater runoff
prior to discharge into a water conservation area. The 3681 acre
Everglades Nutrient Removal Project (ENR) is one of the largest
constructed wetlands in the world and was designed to test the
ability of such areas to meet stringent water quality standards. 1 24 Although considered an initial experiment before the implementation
of a larger treatment system, the EPA required that an NPDES
permit be obtained pursuant to the Clean Water Act. This placed the
burden of proof on the water management district to demonstrate
that the experimental system would meet regulatory water quality
standards. Because the project was designed to test whether it
would work on a larger scale, it implicitly involved fundamental
uncertainties concerning the ability to satisfy standards. The circular
logic involved in requiring managers to give assurances that a project can meet a standard, when the project has been designed to test
whether the standard can be met, could have a substantial chilling
effect on adaptive management projects, particularly those on an
ecosystem scale.
Despite some level of uncertainty, the EPA issued the ENR water
quality permit based on assumptions made concerning the efficacy
of the ENR project to accomplish its remedial objective. Not

121. Volkman & McConnaha, supranote 118, at 1255-56.
122. Id.
123. Flournoy, supranote 105, at 354-56.
124. This project was implemented, after heated public debate, as an "experimental
artificial wetland" designed to remove nutrients, such as phosphorous, from the water runoff
of what is referred to as the Everglades Agricultural Area. See, e.g., John, supra note 44, at 15455. The project was first approved on an experimental basis in 1988 and was proposed again in
the Everglades SWIM plan in 1989. Id.
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surprisingly, the ENR permit was challenged by an environmental
group, the Friends of the Everglades, on the ground that the experimental nature precluded any assurance the discharge would meet
water quality standards. 125
The ENR permit challenge presents an array of example problems associated with the use of adaptive management as a means to
implement ecosystem management. One of the issues raised in the
permit challenge stemmed from EPA's decision not to undertake
NEPA review of the ENR project. EPA's decision was premised on
the ground that a permit issued for a structure designed to improve
water quality was not a "major action significantly affecting the
environment." 126 However, in the context of ecosystem scale experimentation where outcomes are uncertain, a conclusion of this sort
may not always be warranted. Indeed, this too became a basis for
127
the Friends of the Everglades' challenge.
In addition, after the development of NEPA, the legal doctrine of
"segmentation" emerged, reflecting concerns that agencies might
attempt to circumvent NEPA by dividing otherwise major projects
into smaller segments where the individualized NEPA review of
small project segments would not reveal the full range and nature of
environmental impacts. 128 Experiments like the ENR project may be
viewed as a segmentation approach to system scale water quality
management. This also appears to have been a reason for the
Friends of the Everglades' challenge to the ENR on NEPA grounds.
Indeed, the decision of the Florida legislature to adopt the ENR
project concept as the means to treat runoff from the entire Everglades Agricultural Area,129 even before the ENR became operational, suggests that segmentation can occur by default as well.
The Legislature's decision to operationalize the ENR experimental design also raises a political problem encountered in

125. John E. Childe, Friends of the Everglades, Request for Evidentiary Hearing before the
Environmental Protection Agency on NPDES Permit No. FL0043885, at 54 (1994). Similar
concerns were raised regarding the federal dredge and fill permit. Letter from Terry L. Rice,
Colonel, Dep't of the Army, Jacksonville Dist. Corps of Eng'rs, to Sam E. Poole, Executive
Director, South Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. (Feb. 14, 1996) (on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
126. Childe, supra note 125, at 53.
127. The group's comments to the EPA's draft permit provisions stated that "since the ENR
is an experiment, unproven in its ability to treat even phosphorus effectively, an E.I.S....
should be conducted before a permit is issued." Friends of the Everglades, Comments on EPA
Draft Permit No. FL0043885 - Public Notice No. 94fL0004 (undated) (on file at the Center for
Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
128. See generally Daniel R. Mandelker, NEPA LAW AND LMGATION § 9.10, at 20 (1984).
129. FLA. STAT. § 373.4592(4)(a) (1995).
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implementing adaptive management. 130 Adaptive experiments can
be long term and highly visible, developing expectations and reliance among a public anxious for results and reluctant to accept the
experimental nature of the project. In the Northwest, for example, an
adaptive experiment was designed to test the efficacy of relocating
Salmon hatchlings by moving them around dams on the Columbia
River. Even before study results on the long-term effects on the fish
had been obtained, the Northwest Power Planning Council was pressured to operationalize the experiment on a larger scale.131 The
analogy to the ENR project is evident; due to politics involved in the
Everglades restoration, rather than waiting for the results of the ENR
experiment, the initiative was approved systemwide by a hastily
crafted political compromise before it had been fully operationalized
as an experiment.
2. Adaptive Management and the ESA- The Modified Water Deliveries Problem

Proponents of adaptive management cite the congressional mandate to experiment with water deliveries from the Central and
Southern Florida Flood Control Project (C&SF Project) into the Everglades National Park as an example of legislative authorization to
pursue an adaptive management policy in the Everglades ecosystem.
The 1984 legislation authorized the Corps, in conjunction with the
water management district, to experiment with deliveries of water to
the Everglades National Park based on a concept referred to as the
"rainfall plan."' 32 According to one commentator, "[t]he rainfall
plan is part of an experimental program authorized by Congress ...
which permits 'a series of iterative field tests ...

with the ultimate

goal being the development of an optimum delivery plan for

130. Volkman & McConnaha, supra note 118 at 1258-62.
131. The Northwest Power Planning Council was formed in 1981 pursuant to the Pacific
Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act of 1980, 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(a)-839(h)
(1994). Lee & Lawrence, supra note 98, at 433 n.2. As per the instructions of the Act, the Council adopted a program for fish and wildlife in 1982 which was subsequently amended as the
Columbia River Basin Fish and Wildlife Program § 1500 (1984). Id. at 431 & 432 n.1.
132. Supplemental Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 98-181 § 1302, 97 Stat. 1292 (1983)
(codified at 16 U.S.C. § 410(r)(8) (1994)); see also Pub. L. No. 102-104 § 107 (authorizing Pub. L.
No. 98-181 § 1302 to continue as an experimental water delivery until modifications to the
C&SF Project authorized by section 104 of Public Law No. 101-229 were completed and
implemented); Steven S. light & J. Walter Dineen, Water Control in the Everglades: A Historical
Perspective,in EVERGLADES: THE EcOSYSTEM AND ITS RESrORATION 47, 75-80 (Steven M. Davis &
John C. Ogden eds., 1994) (mentioning the rainfall plan and citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENG'RS,
GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM: MODIFIED WATER DELIVERIES TO EVERGLADES NATIONAL
PARK, PARTS I & II (July 1990)).
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the [Everglades National Park]." "1 33 Implementation has proven
problematic.
After a series of experimental tests, the Corps selected an alternative referred to as the "modified raindriven plan" and initiated consultation with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (USFWS)
pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. 134 The USFWS
concluded that the Corps' preferred alternative, the result of an ongoing adaptive process, would "jeopardize the future" of the
federally endangered snail kite by altering hydroperiods in nesting
habitat. 13 5 However, the USFWS authorized the activity through an
1 36
incidental take permit pursuant to the ESA.
Recently, a coalition of prominent environmental groups (coalition) issued a notice of intent (notice) to file suit pursuant to the
citizen suit provisions of the ESA on a variety of grounds, including
the 1990 USFWS Biological Opinion. 137 The coalition alleges that the
Corps failed to consult and to reinitiate consultation with the USFWS
pursuant to Section 7 of the ESA on a variety of water delivery
manipulations taken pursuant to the C&SF Project beginning in
1985,138 the year after the experimental water delivery program was
authorized. The coalition also alleges that water delivery manipulations have also directly taken several species in violation of the
ESA.

139

The recent challenge to the C&SF Project's modified water
deliveries plan suggests that ecosystem-scale experiments involving
populations of endangered species, incidentally or otherwise, are
likely to engender significant opposition, even when couched in the
adaptive patina of increasing scientific understanding. In the notice,
the coalition claimed that even if the Corps had sought and received
approval for an incidental taking in connection with the

133. Light & Dineen, supra note 132, at 80 (citing U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS CENTRAL
AND SOUTHERN FLORIDA PROJECr, WATER CONTROL PLAN FOR WATER CONSERVATION AREAS -

EVERGLADES NATIONAL PARK AND ENP - SOuTH DADE CONVEYANCE SYSTEM (Oct. 1992)).
134. Id. at 76.
135. The USFWS Biological Opinion also intimated that the Corps' experimental tests
should have required consultation. The USFWS issued its report, as well as the Biological
Opinion, in 1990. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, BIOLOGICAL
OPINION, MODIFIED WATER DELIVERIES TO EVERGLADES NATIONAL PARK (Feb. 1990).

136. "Incidental take" authorizes the taking of endangered species when the harm to the
species is "incidental" to the proposed activity, and the take is subject to an approved conservation plan. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(b)(4), 1539(a)(2) (1994).
137. Letter from Natural Resources Defense Council et al. to Bruce K. Babbitt, Secretary,
U.S. Dep't of Interior 6 (Sept. 15,1995) (giving notice of intent to sue for Everglades and Florida
Bay restoration and failure to monitor in accordance with the USFWS Biological Opinion
(1990)) (on file at Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
138. Id. at 4-5.
139. Id.
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experimental water deliveries, "such approval, in any event, would
have no scientific and legal basis." 140 Moreover, it appears that the
coalition has a clear view of what is required to achieve ecosystem
restoration in the Everglades National Park, and hence the measured
policy and management probes premised on scientific uncertainty
are viewed suspiciously. For example, in the notice, the coalition
complains that the Corps' restoration plan will not be implemented
for another twenty years, and they "cannot simply 'wait' another
twenty years." 141 The Corps argues caution is necessary "because of
the uncertainties regarding the ecological responses that will occur as
more natural hydrological conditions are established." 142
C. Conclusions on Adaptive Management
As these cases suggest, the implementation of adaptive management policies is problematic under the current environmental regulatory framework. The application of legal standards like the burden
of proof and the standard of review, along with substantive and
procedural constraints built into legislation like the ESA, may limit
experimentation and, in many cases, frustrate adaptive management
design. Professor A. Dan Tarlock suggests 143 that this result is
inevitable, because adaptive management is the product of thought
in current ecological theory referred to as the "nonequilibrium paradigm" which suggests there is no balance of nature as it has been
historically conceptualized. 14 4 In contrast, most contemporary environmental law emerged from the equilibrium paradigm. As a
result, Tarlock contends that existing legal tools and processes leave
legal decision makers ill-equipped to deal with the open-ended

140. Id. at 5, sec. 3.
141. Id. at 3.
142. C&SF RECONNAISSANCE REPORT, supra note 102, at 114.
143. Professor Tarlock explains in the biographical note attached to his article concerning
the nonequilibrium paradigm in ecology, that he is a Professor of Law at Chicago-Kent College
of Law in the Illinois Institute of Technology. He credits scientists who served with him on
several of the National Academy of Science's National Research Council boards and committees for educating him in the "practice and potential of science." The boards and committees
on which he served dealt with applications of social and physical science information to
environmental regulation. Tarlock, supra note 104, at 1121 n.*.
144. Tarlock, supra note 104, at 1139-44. Indeed, Professor Tarlock has also suggested that
under current standards of judicial review there is a possibility that courts may be unwilling to
recognize the validity of the entire science of conservation biology, the principle scientific basis
of ecosystem management. Id. at 1138 (discussing the possible effect of a products liability case.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), if the principles announced
were applied in the context of regulatory science).
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experimentation, premised on scientific uncertainty, that character145
izes the new paradigm.
Beyond technical legal considerations and the philosophical
dimensions of paradigm shifts, the aforementioned incidents, and
others like them, suggest that political factors may also inhibit ecosystem scale experimentation. The political decision to operationalize the Everglades Nutrient Removal Project experiment even
before the first test results emerged is a case on point. In addition,
environmentalists remain suspicious of bureaucrative motives and
may view adaptive management as just another agency ploy to
pursue traditional resource exploitation policies. This appears to
have been the case with proposed adaptive experiments in timber
harvesting plans in the Pacific Northwest and in the Greater
Yellowstone Ecosystem. 146 Indeed, it is difficult to find references to
any ecosystem scale adaptive management experiments that have
not become embroiled in political controversy.
IV. ECOSYSTEM GOVERNANCE
Ecosystem management's call for geographical and institutional
realignments, the adoption of management theories like adaptive
management, and reaffirmation of humankind's place in the ecosystem management paradigm has prompted a reexamination of the
appropriate mechanisms for ecosystem governance. Throughout the
country, managers and politicians are experimenting with non-traditional interinstitutional, intergovernmental arrangements designed
to move toward ecosystem-level governance. 147 In many, if not most
cases, established institutions with multi-jurisdictional and intergovernmental governance capacity predate the emergence of ecosystem
management as a governance concept. These institutions have
served as convenient laboratories to test the implementation of ecosystem management principles.

145. Tarlock explains that the law requires a "casual link between human behavior and
environmental degradation before an individual can be subject to regulation" and clarifies that,
because this rests on notions fundamental due process, the rules of evidence and standards of
review as currently applied assume that "preexisting data will be collected and applied to
establish cause-in-fact." Id. at 1138.
146. See, e.g., Seattle Audubon Society v. Lyons, 871 F. Supp. 1291 (W.D. Wash. 1994)
(detailing resistance to the plan put into effect in the Pacific Northwest); Bruce Goldstein,
World Resources Institute, The Struggle Over Ecosystem Management at Yellowstone 22-32 (unpublished, undated paper, on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida
College of Law).
147. A prime example of this in application is the use of a compact between agencies
involved in the management of the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area. See Bowen
Blair, Jr., The Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act, Its Genesis and Legislative
History, 17 ENVrL. L. 863, 868 n.5 (1987).
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The nature and extent of multi-jurisdictional management capacity within these regional institutions vary considerably. In some
instances, like the New Jersey Pinelands Reserve Act or the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Council Act,1 48 the
arrangements represent wholesale political realignments where construction and regulatory powers have been shifted to ecosystem or
watershed level institutions. 149 This has been referred to by scholars
in regional public administration as "hard management." 150 In other
instances, like the California Biodiversity Agreement and the Southern Appalachian Biosphere Cooperative Agreement, 151 the arrangements are limited to interinstitutional and intergovernmental coordinating mechanisms and advisory boards, sometimes referred to as
"soft management" mechanisms.15 2 In the contemporary parlance of
ecosystem management, this has also been described as "process"
ecosystem management. 153 Finally, there are a number of grass roots
and nongovernmental initiatives, like the Greater Yellowstone Coalition's A Blueprint for the Future,15 4 and the emerging "bioregional"
movement, that suggest new methods to achieve ecosystem
governance.
All of these arrangements may advance the goals of ecosystem
management by offering alternatives to the institutional arrangements that scientists and managers believe have contributed to ecosystem decline in the past. All offer some potential for application to
the Everglades ecosystem. Each emerged from unique political,
historical and environmental circumstances, however, and must be
viewed accordingly.
A. Regional Compacts
Perhaps the most powerful interinstitutional governance
mechanism available for ecosystems that lie within the jurisdictions
of separate sovereigns in the United States is the compact. Compacts
are typically agreements between states, ratified by Congress. 15 5

148. See infra notes 176 & 268 and accompanying text.
149. Cf. KENNEY & LORD, supranote 7, at 7 (explaining similar shifts).
150. Id. at 7 (citing MARTHA J. DERTHICK, BETWEEN STATE AND NATION: REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES (1974) and differentiating from the soft management advisory
and advocacy functions).
151. See infra note 311 and accompanying text (explaining the Appalachian Cooperative
Agreement); see infra note 325 and accompanying text (explaining the California Agreement).
152. KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 7 (explaining soft management).
153. See GHOST BEARS, supra note 19, at 160; Keiter, supra note 43, at 48.
154. GREATER YELLOWSTONE COALITION, SUSTAINING GREATER YELLOWSTONE, A BLUEPRINT

FOR THE FUTURE (1994) [hereinafter BLUEPRINT].
155. The United States Constitution provides that "No State shall, without the consent of
Congress ...enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10,
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There are, however, hybrid forms in which the federal government is
a party. Even local governments have been participants in compact
commissions. Compacts have been likened to international treaties
since they involve an agreement between separate sovereigns, 156 and
to contracts because they involve mutually enforceable obligations
between parties. 157 Thus, for example, the agreement between the
State of Florida and the Seminole Tribe of Florida concerning water
rights in South Florida is described as a water rights compact. 158 In
recent years, the relevance of the compact form to ecosystem management initiatives has been explicitly recognized, as is indicated by
its incorporation into a proposed federal ecosystem management
59

bill.1

In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, the United States
Supreme Court articulated the indicia of interstate compacts: (1)
establishment of a joint organization for regulatory purposes; (2)
conditional consent by member states in which each state is not free
to modify or unilaterally repeal its participation; and (3) state enactments which require reciprocal action for their effectiveness. 160 Until
recently, the central issue in determining whether a pact is a compact
was the extent to which the interstate agreement encroached on
federal law, thereby requiring the consent of Congress. 161 However,
in Cuyler v. Adams, the United States Supreme Court refused to look
behind the congressional action to determine whether any federal
law had actually been encroached upon, apparently assuming that
congressional ratification itself was sufficient to transform an agreement between states into a compact.162
States have used compacts for a wide variety of reasons, such as
164
resolving boundary disputes, 163 harmonizing criminal procedures,

cl. 3; See also L. Mark Eichorn, Note, Cuyler v. Adams and the Characterizationof Compact Law, 77
VA. L. REv. 1387, 1393 (1991). Once ratified by Congress the Compact has force as an
instrument of federal law. Klickitat County v. State, 862 P.2d 629 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
156. FREDERICK L. ZIMMERMAN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE OF INTERSTATE
COMPACIS 7 (1961).
157. Id. at 2; see also BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 322 (6th ed. 1993); WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED
DICTIONARY 299 (1994).
158. See, e.g., Jerry C. Straus, The Seminole Water Rights Compact and the Seminole Indian Land
Claims Settlement Act of 1987, 6 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 1 (1990).
159. Ecosystem Management Act of 1994, § 217(E)(1)(I), S. 2189, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (June
16,1994).
160. 472 U.S. 159,175 (1985).
161. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503,519 (1893).
162. Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433,440 (1981).
163. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
164. See, e.g., Cuyler, 449 U.S. at 433 (involving the New Jersey Interstate Agreement on
Detainers).
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and streamlining interjurisdictional transportation 165 and regional
planning. 166 Perhaps its most preeminent use, however, is in the
area of interstate water allocation and river basin management. 167 A
flurry of interstate water compacts were enacted during the fifty year
period following the first such compact, the Colorado River Compact, which was concluded in 1929.168 These compacts coincided
generally with the heyday of large public works projects for irrigation, reclamation, flood control, water supply, and power.
Interstate compacts usually feature a governing body known as a
compact commission, headed by gubernatorial appointees of the
compacting states and occasionally non-voting federal members.
Decisions of a compact commission often require a unanimous vote,
a factor that substantially weakens their effectiveness. 169 Often, compact commissions offer a forum for dispute resolution. However, the
actual role and authority of compact commissions is highly variable,
depending largely on local circumstances and political context. 170
Interstate compacts may appear somewhat irrelevant to the Everglades ecosystem, because it lies entirely within the boundaries of
one state. However, management and ownership of the Everglades
ecosystem is shared by separate sovereigns: the federal government,
the State of Florida, and two Indian tribes. In addition to the lessons
compacts provide for interjurisdictional resource management, a hybrid form of compact, referred to as a federal-interstate compact,171
suggests that compact use is not irrelevant to the Everglades
situation. The term "compact" has been used to describe an agreement between the United States and a single state, Montana, governing the disposition of geothermal activity adjacent to Yellowstone
National Park. 172

165. See, e.g., Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. One Parcel of Land, 706 F.2d 1312
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 893 (1983) (holding that the Washington Metropolitan Transit
Authority Compact was federal law).
166. See, e.g., Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-148 (Dec. 18, 1969)
(not codified); Cal. Gov. Code § 66801 (1994); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 277.200 (1993).
167. See, e.g., JEROME C. MuYs, NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, INTERSTATE WATER COMPACTS, INTERSTATE COMPACT AND FEDERAL-INTERSTATE COMPACT (July 1971) (available as
PB202998 from the National Technical Information Service, U.S. Department of Commerce,
Wash., D.C.).
168. KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 19; see also COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, INTERSTATE COMPACTS AND AGENCIES (1983) (providing detailed listing of compact entities, including
their nature and administrative structure).
169. KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 8.
170. Id. at 9.
171. MUYS, supra note 167.
172. Water Rights Compact, H.B. 692, 53d Leg., 1993 Mont (enacted) (compact between

Montana & National Park Service); see also Old Faithful Protection Act, H.R. 1137, 103d Cong.,
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B. Federal-InterstateCompacts

Federal-interstate compacts differ from interstate compacts in
that the federal government participates as a partner in the compact
commission. 173 Commentators view this institutional arrangement
as having all of the hard management potential of traditional interstate compacts, with the added advantage of having the federal
government, with its resources, as a participant. 174 Two institutions
of this nature have been created, one involving the Delaware River
and the other concerning the Susquehanna River. 75 The legislative
and administrative frameworks of the two entities are virtually
identical. Additionally, the Northwest Electric Power Planning and
Conservation Council is another compact entity involving several
states and the federal government, although it differs substantially in
the nature of federal involvement. 176 These federal and state institutions are typically characterized by multiple-purpose mandates,
1 77
which lend credence to their viability as ecosystem managers.
The most significant feature of federal-interstate compacts, the
potential to subordinate federal interests to a regional compact, withstood constitutional challenge in Seattle Master Builders Association v.
Pacific Northwest Electric Power and Conservation Planning Council.178
The Ninth Circuit held that the fact that the Northwest Electric
Power and Conservation Planning Council, created by compact
under the Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation
Act,1 79 had discretion to regulate matters affecting the Bonneville
Power Administration, a federal agency, did not violate the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution. 180 This has been

1st Sess. (1994); Robert B. Keiter, The Old Faithful Protection Act: Congress, National Park Ecosystems, and Private PropertyRights, 14 PUB. LAND L. REV. 5, 27-30 (1993).
173. KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 14.
174. Id.
175. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328, 75 Stat. 688-716 (1961); Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970) (codified at PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 32, § 820.1 (1990)).
176. See infra note 194 and accompanying text.
177. KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 14.
178. 786 F.2d 1359 (9th Cir. 1986).
179. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 96-501,
94 Stat. 2697 (codified as amended in 16 U.S.C. §§ 839(a)-(h) (1994)).
180. Seattle Master Builders Ass'n, 786 F.2d at 1364 (stating that "[tihere is no bar against
federal agencies following policies set by nonfederal agencies. The federal government has in
fact agreed to be bound by state law in several areas."). The plaintiffs contended that the Act
violated the Appointments Clause because it enabled State Governors, instead of the President,
to appoint members of the Council. Id. at 1365. Although commentators had difficulty characterizing the Council's authority over the Bonneville Power Administration, the court found that
the Council was given discretion by 16 U.S.C. section 839b(f)(1) to develop a forecast which
"provides model conservation standards that are cost effective, economically efficient and
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viewed as a significant factor in the development of principles of
federalism in the United States, 181 in addition to its value as a tool for
forging interinstitutional mechanisms for ecosystem management.
The Delaware River Compact requires the development of a
multipurpose basinwide comprehensive plan administered by an
agency called the Delaware River Basin Commission (Commission).182 From an ecosystem management standpoint, the comprehensive nature of the Compact's mandate is notable, since it deals
with water supply, pollution control, flood protection, watershed
management (including soil conservation, forestry, and fish and
wildlife), recreation, hydroelectric power, and the regulation of withdrawals and diversions. 183 The Commission is comprised of the governors of each of the signatory states and one federal commissioner
appointed by the President.184 Decisions are taken by majority vote
rather than the unanimity that is more typical among states reluctant
to sacrifice sovereignty to a regional entity. 185 The Commission is
charged with developing a long range comprehensive plan, and a
water resource program based on the plan that addresses both the
quantity and quality of the water resources in the basin. 186 Significantly, the comprehensive plan is enforceable; all projects within the
basin that may have a "substantial effect on the water resources of
the basin" must be submitted to the Commission for a determination
of consistency with the plan. 187 Proposed state and federal projects
must first be submitted to the Commission and included in the comprehensive plan before they are authorized. 188 The Commission has
both regulatory authority and the authority to finance and construct
capital improvements. 189 In addition, the Commission may assess

reflect regional geographic and climatic differences" and that the value of conservation should
be determined based on "'methodology developed by the Council as part of the plan.'" Id. at
1370 (citing S. Rep. No. 96-272, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1979)).
181. Dave Frohnmayer, Seattle Master Builders and Creative Cooperative Federalism, The
Compact Clause, the Appointments Clauseand the New CooperativeFederalism: The Accommodation of
Constitutional Values in the Northwest Power Act, 17 ENvrL. L. 767, 776 (1987); see also Seattle
Master BuildersAss'n, 768 F.2d at 1376 (Beezer, J., dissenting). It is noteworthy that one of the
examples offered by the court was the Federal Flood Control Act under which federal flood
control projects are subject to state water law. Id. at 1364; see also Frohnmayer,supra, at 775.
182. See Frohnmayer, supra note 181, at 767.
183. Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 87-328,75 Stat. 688-716 (1961).

184. Id. §§ 4-10.
185. Id. § 2.2.
186. Id. § 5; see also KENNEY & LORD, supra note 7, at 8-9; MICHAEL J. DONAHUE, MICHIGAN
SEA GRANT COLLEGE PROGRAM, INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENrS FOR GREAT LAKES MANAGE-

MENT: PASr PRACrlCES AND FUTURE ALTERNATIVES (1987).
187. Delaware River Basin Compact, supranote 183, § 3.2.
188. Id. § 3.8.
189. Id. §§ 11.1, .2.
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fees for the use of its facilities, 190 another factor of great significance
for the independence of a regional entity.
1. The Northwest Power Act
The Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act 19 1
is noteworthy as a model for multi-jurisdictional ecosystem management, for launching a new era of creative cooperative federalism, 19 2
and as a laboratory for adaptive management. This compact attempts to reconcile the provision of hydroelectric power from the
Columbia River Basin in the four state region of Washington, Montana, Oregon, and Idaho with the effects of power generation on fish
and wildlife, particularly spawning anadromous fish.1 93 The compact created a Council consisting of two gubernatorial appointees
1 95
from each state. 194 Council decisions are made by majority vote,
effectively subordinating state and federal sovereignty to the
regional Council.
The compact requires the Council to prepare a Regional Conservation and Electric Power Plan, and a program to "protect, mitigate,
and enhance fish and wildlife including related spawning grounds
196 Signifiand habitat, on the Columbia River and its tributaries."
cantly, from the standpoint of ecosystem management principles, the
compact requires that the fish and wildlife program "deal with [the
Columbia River] and its tributaries as a system." 197 In addition, the
Compact requires the Bonneville Power Administration and other
federal agencies to provide "equitable treatment" of fish and wildlife
and their habitat with the purposes of power generation at
hydroelectric facilities, 198 effectively elevating the ecosystem to a
coequal status with power development considerations within the
basin. The Compact also provides that user fees attached to utility
rates may pay for the fish and wildlife mitigation and enhancement

190. Id. § 3.7.
191. See supra note 179.
192. Frohnmayer, supra note 181, at 768.
193. "Adaptive management was first applied as an explicit policy on the ecosystem scale
in the 1984 revision of the Columbia basin program". LEE, supranote 119, at 54. Lee, a political
scientist, is a principle proponent of adaptive management and served on the Northwest Power
Planning Council. Id. at vii. Lee criticizes the plan for over emphasis on salmon and its spawning habits, but concludes that the plan nonetheless "exercises ecosystem influence." Id. at 56.
194. 16 U.S.C. § 839b(a)(2)(B) (1994).
195. Id. § 839b(a)(2)(B).
196. Id. § 839b(c)(2).
197. Id. § 839b(h)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
198. Id.
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program. 199 Both of these characteristics, a level playing field for
ecosystem considerations and a financial mechanism derived from
the use of the ecosystem, are highly significant from the standpoint
of ecosystem management. 20 0
2. The Lake Tahoe Regional PlanningCompact
The Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact provides an interesting example of a multi-jurisdictional hard management instrument involving a shared boundary resource among sovereigns. Perhaps this compact's greatest contributions have been the creation of a
commission with authority to manage a shared water resource and a
governance structure for regional resource management. 20 1 However, despite broad resource regulatory and management authority,
water quantity issues appear to be excluded from the compact's
jurisdiction due in part to the existence of a prior interstate water
allocation compact.
The Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact 2 2 was first adopted
by the states of California and Nevada in 1969.203 The two states and
The Compact
Congress strengthened the compact in 1980.204
emerged as a result of growing concern over the effects that rapid
growth and development was having on Lake Tahoe, a shared boundary water between California and Nevada. 20 5 The Compact established the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (Agency), with what one
court has described as "broad powers to make and enforce a regional
plan of an unusually comprehensive scope." 20 6 Perhaps most
interesting, the Agency consists of representatives of state and local
government. 207 The federal government, however, does not sit on

199. The compact requires that fish and wildlife be protected, mitigated, and enhanced. Id.
839b(h)(11)(A)(i). In addition, the compact provides that customers will pay all costs
necessary to conserve the resources and meet power requirements. Id. § 839(4).
200. See Lee & Lawrence, supra note 98, at 439; see also LEE, supra note 119, at 19-50, 64-65.
201. Lake Tahoe is the boundary between California and Nevada. The basin area includes
"three Nevada counties, two California counties, one California city, and a dozen federal and
state agencies with varying degrees of responsibility." Gary D. Meyers & Jean Meschke, Pro-

§

posed FederalLand Use Management of the ColumbiaRiver Gorge, 15 ENVTL. L. 71, 89 (1984).
202. Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980) (not
codified); CAL. GOVT CODE § 66801 (West 1994); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.200 (1993).
203. Pub. L. No. 91-148 (1969) (not enacted).
204. Pub. L. No. 96-551, 94 Stat. 3233 (1980).
205. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE HONORABLE HARRY
REID, U.S. SENATE, FOREST SERVICE, LAND AcQuIsmoNs WITHIN THE LAKE TAHOE BASIN 4,
GAO/ RCED-95-22 (Oct 1994).
206. People v. County of El Dorado, 487 P.2d 1193,1196 (Cal. 1971).
207. The Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 277.200 (1993).
The California delegation includes representatives of two counties and one city government
appointed by the respective governing bodies, one member appointed by the governor, one
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the Agency even though it is a major landholder within the Lake
Tahoe Basin.208 A capped apportionment formula divided among
the local governments within the region, with unspecified additional
discretionary contributions provided by the states, also pursuant 20to9
an apportionment formula, provides the Agency's financial base.
The powers of the Agency include the authority to adopt and enforce
a regional plan, to implement ordinances in furtherance of the plan,
210
and to establish "environmental threshold carrying capacities."
While more than a majority vote is required in some cases, the Compact does not require unanimity to promulgate Agency decisions, to
211
adopt or amend the regional plan, or to implement ordinances.
Accordingly, both state and local sovereignty is effectively ceded to
the regional entity.
The Compact requires that the regional plan be a single enforceable plan with correlated elements, including a land use plan which
provides the following:
integrated arrangement and general location and extent of, and the
criteria and standards for, the use of land, water, air, space and
other natural resources within the region, including but not limited
to, an indication or allocation of maximum population densities
and permitted uses. 212
Other plan elements include transportation, conservation, recreation,
and public services and facilities. 213 In addition, local governments
may enact stricter ordinances than those required by the plan, but
are otherwise preempted. 214 Projects, defined as activities that may
substantially affect the resources of the region, 215 require Agency
approval and must be consistent with the regional plan to be
approved. 216 Interestingly, the Compact provides that the Agency

member appointed by the speaker of the state assembly, and one member appointed by the
Senate Rules Committee (these latter state appointees represent the state at large and may not
reside within the jurisdiction). Id. at art. III(a)(1). The Nevada delegation has a similar composition, with one less state representative. Id. at art. III(a)(2).
208. UNITED STATES GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, supra note 205, at 2. A representative
of the U.S. Forest Service does, however, sit on the Agency's Advisory Planning Commission.
Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, supra note 202, at art. III(h).
209. Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Compact, supra note 202, at art. VIII(a).
210. Id. at art. I(b).
211. To adopt, amend, or repeal environmental threshold carrying capacities, the regional
plan, ordinances, rules or regulations, the vote of at least four members of a state, in agreement
with the vote of at least four members of the other state, is required. Id. at art. 111(g)(1).
212. Id. at art. V(c)(1).
213. Id. at arts. V(c)(2)-(5).
214. Id. at art. VI(a).
215. Id. at art. II(h).
216. Id. at art. VI(b).
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must prepare an environmental impact statement when "acting upon
matters that have a significant effect on the environment," including
217
proposed projects.
The original Lake Tahoe Compact was criticized as a failure for a
number of reasons. Perhaps the most significant of these was the
preponderance of local government officials on the original Agency,
218
which was thought to lead to parochialism in land use decisions.
In its first ten years, the Agency approved ninety-six percent of the
development proposals it considered. 219 The 1980 Compact reformed the Agency's composition by increasing the state appointees
by four, altering the balance of power. 220 In addition, a provision in
which development proposals were deemed approved unless specifically denied within sixty days was amended to require the Agency
to explicitly deny or approve proposals. 221 Nonetheless, in 1984 a
federal court enjoined the Agency from approving any further
development projects until the states adopted a management plan in
compliance with the Compact. 222
3. Columbia River Gorge Compact

The latest major administrative experiment in regionalism, the
Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act,2 3 also represents
the most complex and carefully balanced effort to reconcile federal,
state, and local sovereignty concerns under a single management

217. Id. at art. VII(a).
218. The Tahoe experience demonstrates that local residents of the area are subject to
development pressures. See Meyers & Meschke, supra note 201, at 91. "[Tlhe Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency... achieved national recognition as a failure." Blair supra note 147, at 892.
The original compact contained a ten member commission, six of whom were representatives
of local governments within the Agency's jurisdiction. Id. at 892-93 (citing Lake Tahoe Bi-State
Compact, Act of Dec. 18, 1969, Pub. L.No. 91-148, 83 Stat. 360 (1969), at art. III(a)). Although
this compact was approved by a special act of Congress, it was not codified in the U.S.C. Id. at
892 n.109. The original compact was called the Lake Tahoe Bi-state Compact, but was referred
to as the Tahoe Regional Planning Compact when codified in the California and Nevada
statutes. Lake Tahoe Planning Compact, supra note 202.
219. Blair, supra note 147, at 892 (citing Bookman, Lake Tahoe PlanHolds Lessons for Columbia
River Gorge, VANCOUVER COLUMBIAN, Apr. 10,1983, at C15). These projects were approved not
only because of the preponderance of local officials in the Agency, but also because the
representatives of the two states often could not agree and the original compact provided that
any proposed development project not specifically denied with 60 days was approved. Id. at
893 n.115.
220. Id. at 893 (citing the Lake Tahoe Bi-State Compact, Act of Dec. 19,1980, Pub. L. 96-551,
94 Stat. 3233 (1980)).
221. Id. at 893 n.115 (citing Act of Dec. 19,1980 at art. I1I(g)(1)).
222. California v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 1994 WL 6591 (E.D. Cal. June 15,1984)
(granting preliminary injunction in No. Civ. 5-84-0561 EJG and S-84-0565 EJG), affd., 766 F.2d
1308 (9th Cir. 1985), amended, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1985).
223 16 U.S.C. §§ 54 4 -544(p) (1994).
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regime. Indeed, soon after its passage, it was touted as a model for
other natural systems, including the Everglades ecosystem. 224 At the
same time, the long and tortured legislative history of the Act, and its
complex statutory framework, suggests the increasing difficulty of
multi-jurisdictional regional ecosystem-scale management initiatives
in the United States, particularly in the era of new federalism and
increasing hostility toward government. 25
The federal legislation that emerged in 1986 represents nearly a
decade of efforts to reconcile the geopolitical complexities of the
Columbia River Gorge with its management requirements. The
National Scenic Area encompassed six counties, nine cities, seven
ports, and numerous unincorporated communities in the states of
Washington and Oregon, as well as at least twenty-six other administrative entities with jurisdiction.226 The impetus for the legislation's unique framework came largely as a reaction to a request to
227
study the area for inclusion in the National Park System.
The federal legislation and subsequent state compact establishing
the National Scenic Area preserves the dual management authority
of the federal and state governments. The Scenic Area is divided
into three management categories, classified as special management
areas (SMAs), urban areas (UAs), and general management areas
(GMAs), whose boundaries are included on a map incorporated into
the legislation.228 The thirteen cities and towns within the UAs are
exempt from the Act.229

The United States Forest Service has jurisdiction over the
SMAs, 230 which comprise approximately forty-five percent of
231
the Scenic Area. The SMAs include both public and private land,
232
and are the most significant lands for Scenic Area purposes.
The Forest Service has administrative authority to make minor

1224. Blair, supra note 147, at 868 n.5 (citing THE OREGONIAN, Nov. 24,1986 at 1, col. 2). The
Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 5 4 4 - 5 4 4 (p) (1994), created a
"novel mechanism for protecting large, populous, and geopolitically-complex areas which...
may be unsuitable for more traditional protection as a national park or national recreation
area." Id. at 867.
225. Both the legislative history of the Colombia River Gorge legislation and an excellent
narrative description of its statutory framework are discussed in exhaustive detail in Blair's
article. Blair, supra note 147.
226. Id. at 872.
227. Id. at 879-80.
228. 16 U.S.C. §§ 544, 544b(a)(2), 544b(b)(2)(A), 544b(e)(2) (1994); see also Blair, supra note
147, at 935-36.
229. 16 U.S.C. §§ 5440)(2), 544b(e)(1) (1994).
230. The jurisdiction of the Forest Service is implemented by the Secretary of Agriculture
who has authority over the SMAs. 16 U.S.C. § 544f(a)(1) (1994).
231. Blair, supra note 147, at 935.
232. Id. at 934.
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revisions to the SMA boundaries, subject to certain consultation
233
requirements.
The GMAs, which also encompass about forty-five percent of the
Scenic Area,23 are managed by the Columbia River Gorge Commission, as enabled by the Federal Act 235 and established pursuant to
state compact. 236 The Commission is comprised of twelve voting
members. 237 Half of the voting members are appointed by each
state's Governor and half by the governing body of each county
within the Scenic Area.2 38 Those appointed by a county's governing
body must reside within the county, but not necessarily the Scenic
Area.239 One gubernatorial appointee from each state must reside
within the Scenic Area. 240 Interestingly, no member of the Commission may be a locally appointed or elected official. 24 1 This provision is apparently premised on the concern that an appointed or
elected official may be more likely to engage in short-term
decisionmaking 242 due to political considerations. In addition, the
United States Forest Service sits in an ex officio capacity on the
243
Commission.
The dual federal-state management scheme is reconciled through
the development of a comprehensive management plan.244 Both the
federal legislation and the state compact require that local land use
activities within the Scenic Area be consistent with the management
plan.2 45 The Forest Service and the Commission prepare plans for
the SMAs and GMAs respectively. 246 These plans must be based on
a resource inventory, an economic opportunity study, and a recreational assessment of the Scenic Area. 247 Both the Commission and
the Secretary of Agriculture (i.e., the Forest Service) must develop

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

16 U.S.C. § 544b(c) (1994).
Blair, supra note 147, at 935.
16 U.S.C. § 544c(A)1(a) (1994).
See OR. REV. STAT. § 196.150 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 43.97.015 (1995).
16 U.S.C. § 544c(a)(1)(C) (1994).
Id.
Id. § 544c(a)(1)(C)(i).
Id. §§ 544c(a)(1)(C)(ii)-(iii).
Id. § 544c(a)(3).
Blair, supra note 147, at 936.
16 U.S.C. § 544c(a)(1)(C)(iv) (1994).
Blair, supra note 147, at 937.

245. Id.
246. 16 U.S.C. §§ 544d(a)(1)(B), (a)(3)(D), (c)(4), (c)(5)(A) (1994) (referring to SMAs); id. §
544e(a) (referring to GMAs).
247. Id. § 544d(a)(1) (requiring resource inventory); id. § 544d(a)(2) (requiring economic
opportunity study); id. § 544d(a)(3) (requiring recreation assessment).
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land use designations within the Scenic Area that are consistent with
248
a set of development standards listed in the legislation.
The final Comprehensive Management Plan (Plan) contains the
249
components developed by the Forest Service and the Cornmission.
The Plan must include the land use designations adopted by each
entity and incorporate without change the Forest Service's management direction for federal lands, as well as the Forest Service's guide250
lines for the development of land use ordinances within SMAs.
Adoption of the Plan requires a majority vote by the full Commission, including the affirmative vote of at least three members from
each state. 25 1 The Secretary of Agriculture must then have an opportunity to approve the Plan.252 If the Secretary does not concur with
the Plan, suggested modifications will be made and the Commission
may revise it, or adopt by vote a Plan that is consistent with the Act's
requirements. 25 3 A two-thirds vote of the Commission, including the
majority of members from each state, is required to adopt a Plan that
25 4
has not been modified according to the Secretary's suggestions.
The Plan will subsequently be reviewed at least every ten years to
determine whether revisions are needed. 25 5
Once approved, local governments must submit revised land use
ordinances for approval to the Commission regardless of whether
they lie within an SMA or GMA. 256 If the land use ordinance is
approved by the Commission, and it is within an SMA, it is forwarded to the Secretary of Agriculture for concurrence. 25 7 The cumbersome and more complex provisions for SMAs were apparently
included to alleviate concerns in Congress and the Reagan administration that the Act would authorize "federal zoning," 258 and were
based on the approach used in the Cape Cod National Seashore
legislation, 25 9 discussed later in this section.
The Scenic Area legislation contains a number of other noteworthy provisions. The Act provides an interim regulatory framework until completion and approval of the Plan that vests substantial

248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.

Id. § 544d(b)(1).
Id. §§ 544d(c)(1)-(5).
Id. §§ 544d(c)(2), (c)(4), (c)(5)(A).
Id. § 544d(c).
Id. § 544d(f)(1).
Id. §§ 544d(f)(2), (3)(A)-(B).
Id. § 544d(f)(3)(B).
Id. § 544d(g).
Id. §§ 544e(b)(1) (concerning GMAs), 544f(h)(2) (concerning SMAs).
Id. § 544f0).
Blair, supra note 147, at 920-22,945.
Id. at 951-53.
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authority in the federal government. 260 The Act and counterpart
state compact legislation requires federal and state agencies with
jurisdiction within the Scenic Area to exercise their authority in a
manner consistent with the respective legislation. 261 The Act also
includes special provisions to protect tributaries to the Columbia
River Gorge.262 For example, tributaries that flow through the SMAs
are automatically classified as wild and scenic rivers under the
National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 263
Federal financial and technical assistance is provided to local
governments to develop local land use ordinances, 264 and local governments are authorized to receive a greater percentage of the timber
receipts and payments in lieu of taxes for lands acquired by the
Forest Service within SMAs. 265 The Act provides both the Secretary
of Agriculture and the Commission with the authority to seek injunctive relief for violations of the Act, the management plan, or land use
ordinances within their respective jurisdictions. 266 A citizen suit
provision is also included which authorizes adversely affected citizens to sue the Commission, the Secretary, or any county for vio26 7
lations of the Act.

C. Federal and State Regional Legislation

In addition to the compact instrument, there have been a number
of federal and state legislative initiatives aimed at overcoming the institutional boundary difficulties associated with multi-jurisdictional
governance of ecosystems or watersheds. Even though not formally
styled as such, many of these enjoy the attributes of resource compacts, for example, agreements between sovereigns to cooperatively
manage a resource. In addition, some possess hard management features where some sovereignty is ceded and governance, including
regulatory oversight, is transferred to an ecosystem level entity.

260. Id. at 953-55.
261. Id. at 957.
262. Id. at 957-60.
263. 16 U.S.C. § 544k(a) (1994).
264. Id. § 5441(a).
265. Blair, supra note 147, at 961-62. Payments in lieu of taxes are a means by which the
federal government compensates local governments for the diminution of the property tax base
occasioned by the conversion of taxable private property to public lands. Id.
266. Id. at 962-63. However, the Secretaries are only granted the authority to request the
U.S. Attorney General to seek an injunction. Id.
267. 16 U.S.C. § 544m(b)(2) (1994).
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1. The New Jersey PinelandsReserve Act
Perhaps the most celebrated effort at regional ecosystem scale
governance is found in the New Jersey Pinelands National Reserve
(Reserve). The Reserve comprises approximately one million acres of
pine barrens interspersed with urban and agricultural land uses in
close proximity to several major metropolitan areas, including New
York City.268 It has attracted international attention as a functioning
example of the biosphere reserve model of protected areas management, integrating human and natural systems. 269 It has attracted
national attention for its reliance on state and local cooperative
management, although both federal and state governments retain
significant oversight control over regional administration.
Although the economic and political stimulus for the Reserve
emerged at the federal level, management occurs primarily at the
state and local level. In 1978, Congress established the Reserve as a
270
unique federal lands designation within the National Park System.
The principal feature of the legislation was the inclusion of economic
incentives, especially for land acquisition, to encourage New Jersey
and local governments to adopt an ecosystem level governance
strategy that minimized federal management. The Act called for the
Secretary of the Interior to request that the Governor of New Jersey
form a state planning entity for the purposes of preparing a comprehensive master plan for the Reserve. The planning entity included a federal representative, representatives of each of the counties within the Reserve, and seven at-large members appointed by
the Governor. 271 The planning entity was charged with a number of
implementation responsibilities, including the development of
components to ensure coordination and consistency among local,
state and federal programs and policies, 272 and programs for state
and local implementation providing for the "maximum feasible
local government and public participation" in the Reserve's

268. Ralph E. Good & Norma F. Good, The PinelandNational Reserve: An Ecosystem Approach
to Management, 34 BIOSCIENCE 169, 169 (Mar. 1984); see generally PROTECTING THE NEW JERSEY
PINELANDS (Beryl R. Collins & Emily W.B. Russell eds., 1988).
269. CYRIL DE KLEMM, UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC & CULTURAL ORGANIZATION, ADVISORY COMMITEE ON BIOSPHERE RESERVES, STUDY ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF

BIOSPHERE RESERVES 2 (Apr. 1992) (a preliminary study presented at the Paris conference in
1992, SC/92/CONF.502/5, as requested by UNESCO, which is on file at the Center for Govtl.
Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
270. National Parks and Recreation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-625 § 502, 92 Stat. 3492
(1978) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 471i (1994)).
271. 16 U.S.C. § 471i(d) (1994).
272. Id. § 471i(f)(4).
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management. 273 Failure to adopt a plan acceptable to the Secretary
of the Interior would have resulted in a termination of further federal
assistance. 274 Moreover, all revisions to the comprehensive plan also
require federal approval, and can result in a similar sanction. 275 The
National Park Service has been charged with providing the federal
276
role in Reserve management.
Land acquisition was also geared toward maximizing state and
local, rather than federal ownership. The federal government could
either provide funds for land acquisition or acquire the land itself
and then convey it to the appropriate state or local governmental
277
entity upon approval of the comprehensive management plan.

To implement the federal legislation, New Jersey enacted state
legislation creating the New Jersey Pinelands Commission as an
independent regional governance body according to the federal
directive. 278 While the composition of the Commission followed the
federal guidelines, the state legislation provides the Governor with
veto authority over Commission actions and the power to appoint
the Commission's chairperson, effectively retaining state sovereignty
over the region.279 The state legislation also gives the Commission
authority to implement the comprehensive master plan, institutionalizing its governance role. Local government master plans must
conform to the regional plan and the Commission has final review
authority over all development activities in the Reserve. 280
The Pinelands state legislation also creates a Pinelands Municipal
Council, consisting of the mayor or a designee of the mayor from
each municipality located in the Reserve. 281 The Act requires the
Commission to submit the comprehensive management plan, and
any revisions to the plan, including any minimum standards for
municipal and county plans and ordinances, to the Council for consideration prior to adoption. 282 The Council has sixty days to "state
its position" on the plan or amendments, but its recommendations
are merely advisory. 283 The Commission retains discretion to submit
other matters to the Council for advisory opinions. 284 Moreover, the

273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.

Id. §§ 471i(f)(7)-(8).
Id. § 471i(g)(5).
Id. § 471i(g)(6).
PROTECTING THE NEW JERSEY PINELANDs, supra note 268, at 177-79.
16 U.S.C. § 471i(h) (1994).
N.J. REV. STAT. § 13:18A-4.a. (1994 & Supp. 1995).
Id. H8 13:18A-5.g-h.
Id. § 13:18A-12.
Id. § 13:18A-7.a.
Id. § 13:18A-7.f.
Id. §§ 13:18A-7.g-h.
Id. § 13:18A-7.f.
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Council may submit recommendations to the Commission on any
matter it deems advisable, regardless of whether the matter was
28
referred by the Commission. 5
In addition, the state legislation creates an independent Pinelands Development Credit Bank, housed within the State Department of Banking. 286 The Bank is governed by a Board of Directors
consisting of ex officio representatives of three state agencies, the
Chairman of the Commission, and an equal number of representa287
tives from the Reserve appointed by the Governor.
D. Soft Management- Interinstitutionaland Intergovernmental
CoordinationMechanisms
1. The GreatLakes Commission and Ecosystem Charter
The Great Lakes Commission is a regional coordinating body
created by interstate compact in 1955 to promote integrated comprehensive use and conservation of the water resources in the Great
Lakes Basin. 288 Perhaps the most interesting feature is the invitation
it offers to Canadian provinces within the basin to join in the
compact in the same capacity as states,289 although apparently none
have done so. Although created by compact, the Commission's functions remain completely advisory and, indeed, it is expressly forbidden from wielding any regulatory authority. 290 The Commission
does, however, have the authority to collect and interpret data,
consider the need for navigation and public works projects in
the basin, undertake policy analysis, and draft model uniform
legislation.291 In this capacity, the Commission is a useful interjurisdictional mechanism for promoting the development of basin science
and policy at the ecosystem level. This is a particularly useful tool

285. Id. § 13:18A-7.h.
286. Id. § 13:18A-33.a.
287. Id. § 13:18A-33.b.
288. Letter from Joseph K. Hoffman, Chair, Great Lakes Commission, to Thomas T.
Ankersen, Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law (Sept.
8, 1994) (on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law);
see also MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32201, at art. IV (West 1995).
289. This is reflected in the final draft of the new Ecosystem Charter for the Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence Basin published in August of 1994 and in article II of its codification. Great Lakes
Basin Compact, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 324.32201 (West 1995). The Preamble of the Ecosystem Charter explains that the foundation for the Charter "is a heritage of binational cooperation
to ensure the informed use, management, conservation, and protection of the Great Lakes - St.
Lawrence Ecosystem" and is built upon agreements such as the U.S. - Canada Boundary
Waters Treaty of 1909. THE GREAT LAKES COMMISSION, ECOSYSTEM CHARTER FOR THE GREAT
LAKES - ST. LAWRENCE BASIN, FINAL DRAFr i (1994).
290. Id. at art. VI.N.
291. Id. at arts. VI.A.-N.
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where there is no other ecosystem level entity, especially in an ecosystem like the Great Lakes Basin which is politically fragmented by
a plethora of separate sovereigns, including nation-states, and institutionally fragmented by a variety of regional and subregional enti292
ties governing different aspects of ecosystem policy.
Indeed, the Great Lakes Commission recently spearheaded a
drive to adopt an Ecosystem Charter for the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence Basin. According to its authors, this vision document sets forth
a "series of guideposts to achieve [the vision] through principles and
findings drawn from existing laws, treaties, agreements, and policies." 293 Notwithstanding its legislative history from the preecosystem management era, the charter principles reflect the equivalent of many principles recently articulated as the basis of ecosystem management. In addition, in 1989 the governors of the Great
Fund" in the
Lakes states endowed the "Great Lakes Protection
294
endowment.
nation's first multistate environmental
2. The Cape Cod National Seashore Commission
The Cape Cod National Seashore (Seashore) provides a different
model of a direct federal/local government partnership. 295 The
administrative boundaries of the Seashore include a variety of
federal, state, and privately owned lands, and six local governments.
As the first National Park to be created within and surrounding an
area with 300 years of settlement history, it has been heralded as a
296
successful experiment in "bioregionalism" by one commentator.
The Seashore's enabling legislation authorized land acquisition
by condemnation. 297 However, within the six municipalities involved, federal condemnation authority is suspended where the
Secretary of the Interior approves the municipalities' zoning

292. See generally Michael J. Donahue, Toward Ecosystem Management in the Great Lakes
Basin: The OverlappingImpacts of Water Quantity and Water Quality,25 U. TOL. L. REV. 443 (1994).
293. Letter from Joseph K. Hoffman, supra note 288.
294. See BIOLOGICAL CONSERVATION NEWSLETrER NO. 134, DEP'T OF BOTANY, SMITHSONIAN
INSTITUTE, GREAT LAKES PROTECION FUND 1-2 (July 1994).
295. Pub. L. No. 87-126 § 5, 75 Stat. 284 (1961) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 459b-1 to 459b-8
(1994)).
296. See CHARLES H.W. FOSTER, THE CAPE COD NATIONAL SEASHORE: A LANDMARK
ALLIANCE 67-68 (1985). The Seashore was the first major national park for which Congress
authorized funds to facilitate acquisition by the National Park Service; this was necessary
because of the many different major landowners in the area, which included both state and
federal entities. Id. Commenting on the success of the Seashore as a bioregional experience,
Foster notes that the Seashore was a sound implementer of conservation, but he contributes a
large portion of the success to the Advisory Commission that kept the "successive park
at 82.
administrations' feet to the fire on this issue." Id.
297. 16 U.S.C. § 459b-1 (1994); FOSTER, supra note 296, at 67-68.
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ordinances pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary.
This coercive authority is an unusual feature which allows direct
federal oversight of local land use decisionmaking. To receive approval, local zoning bylaws must prohibit all commercial and
industrial uses other than those permitted by the Secretary by
regulation,298 and promote the preservation and development of the
Seashore.
The enabling legislation also calls for the creation of an Advisory
Commission, with a ten year statutory life, 299 and subsequent biennial administrative renewals. 30° The Commission is comprised of
representatives from each of the six municipalities, a representative
of the county that comprises the Cape, two representatives of the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, and one representative of the
Department of the Interior. 30 1 The Commission's authority is only
advisory, although the Secretary is required to consult with the Commission prior to decisions concerning the use of property within the
Seashore. 302 This continuing consultation requirement has been
viewed as a significant factor in the Commission's success in influ3°3
encing policy decisions within the Seashore.
3. Biosphere Reserves: The Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative
Biosphere reserves are an international designation for protected
areas established under the auspices of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). 30 4 Designations are made by an international coordinating committee pursuant to the recommendations of national committees. The classical
biosphere reserve model incorporates a "core area," usually a park or
other similar management category for strict nature protection, a
"buffer zone" or multiple use zone that incorporates manipulative
research and extraction activities such as forestry, and a "zone of

298. 16 U.s.c

§§ 5(b)-(c) (1994).

299. Id. § 8.
300. FOSTER,supra note 296, at 46.
301. Pub. L. No. 87-126 § 8(b), 75 Stat. 284 (1961) (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 459b-1 to 459b-8
(1994)).

302. Id.§§ 8(f)-(g).
303. "Far from being constrained by any lack of authority, the Commission had actually
gained latitude in expressing its opinions, unencumbered as it now was by any official responsibility for its recommendations." FOSTER,supra note 296, at 81-82.
304. See Michel Batisse, The Biosphere Reserve: A Tool for Environmental Conservation and
Management, 9 ENVTL. CONSERVATION 101-11 (Summer 1982). Batisse, the Deputy Assistant
Director-General for Science (Env't and Natural Resources) of UNESCO, explains that the
program on Man and the Biosphere, from which USMAB originated, was initiated by a
resolution of the 'Biosphere Conference' convened in Paris by UNESCO in 1968. Id. at 101.
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transition" or cooperation for traditional land use.305 There are a
substantial number of biosphere reserves in the United States, mostly
corresponding to significant national parks and other already established protected areas. 306 For example, Everglades National Park is
an internationally recognized biosphere reserve. 30 7 Although some
countries have adopted the biosphere reserve model as a formalized
category of protected area subject to management and regulation, the
United States has not.30 8 In the United States, the concept remains

focused primarily on the soft management objectives of research,
monitoring, and education for existing protected areas. The classical
biosphere reserve model, however, more truly reflects the principles
of ecosystem management, with an emphasis on human/ecosystem
interactions. 30 9 The New Jersey Pinelands, also a designated biosphere reserve, reflects these principles, and indeed has been touted
310
as an international exemplar of the model.
The Southern Appalachian Man and the Biosphere Cooperative
is an initiative of the United States Man and the Biosphere Program
to foster regionalism in reserve management. The Southern Appalachians region contains three biosphere reserves, including the Great
Smoky Mountains National Park, the United States Forest Service's
Coweeta Hydrologic Laboratory in North Carolina, and the National
Environmental Research Park in Oak Ridge Tennessee. In 1988,
these three reserves were included in USMAB's first regional biosphere reserve, known as the Southern Appalachian Regional

305. Id. at 102; see also Michel Batisse, Developing and Focusing the Biosphere Reserve Concept,
22 NATURE & NAT. RESOURCES 2 (1986) (describing the formulation of the biosphere reserve
concept based on the author's keynote address presented at the European MAB Conference on
Biosphere Reserves and Ecological Monitoring in Ceske Budejovice, Czechoslovakia in 1986).
306. DE KLEMM, supranote 269, at 1.
307. Sax & Keiter, supra note 42, at 248 n.174. The biosphere reserves in the U.S. "include:
Big Bend, Big Thicket, Redwood, Cumberland Island, Cape Lookout, Channel Islands, Denali,
Everglades, Glacier Bay, Glacier, Great Smoky Mountains, Haleakala, Hawaii Volcanoes, Isle
Royale, Death Valley, Joshua Tree, Gates of the Arctic, Noatak, Olympic, Organ Pipe Cactus,
Rocky Mountain, Sequoia-Kings Canyon, Congaree Swamp, Virgin Islands, [and] Yellowstone." Id.
308. DE KLEMM, supranote 269, at 2.
309. As previously noted, Everglades National Park is an internationally recognized
biosphere reserve, yet the designation, limited by the Park boundaries, has none of the
man/environment interface management attributes typically attributed to biosphere reserves.
A project sponsored by the United States Man and the Biosphere Human Dominated Ecosystem Directorate recently focused on the Everglades and identified a number of scenarios for
Everglades management based on biosphere reserve principles. For the purposes of analysis,
all of these scenarios expanded the boundaries of the Everglades Biosphere Reserve to more
accurately reflect biosphere reserve and ecosystem management principles. USMAB, supra
note 5. No proposal to actually amend the boundaries to reflect these principles is forthcoming,
however.
310. See DE KLEMM, supra note 269, at 2.
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Biosphere Reserve (Regional Reserve), which extends from Southern
Georgia to Northern Virginia, and encompasses federal, state, and
311
private lands.
To implement the regional perspective associated with the
Regional Reserve, a number of federal land management agencies
entered into an interagency cooperative agreement. The agreement
also enabled the participation of state agencies as well as non-profit
organizations. In addition, the Regional Reserve sponsors formed a
non-profit organization known as the Southern Appalachian Man
and the Biosphere Foundation to develop a "model of cooperative,
integrated, regional resource management." 31 2 Most of the founding
313
directors are the federal signatories to the cooperative agreement.
The cooperation model exemplified by the Regional Reserve recently
received recognition as an appropriate ecosystem management coordination mechanism by the federal Interagency Task Force on
314
Ecosystem Management.
4. The GreaterYellowstone CoordinatingCommittee
In many respects the controversy over management of Yellowstone National Park and its surrounding ecosystem may be viewed
as the catalyst for the emergence of the ecosystem management
paradigm. Scientists in the 1970s concluded that the Park itself was
too small to insure an intact ecosystem, which led to its designation
as a Greater Ecosystem.31 5 Greater Ecosystem in the context of
Yellowstone is characterized as the area needed to ensure a viable
population of grizzly bears. Encompassed within this area are three
states, seven national forests and two national parks, as well as three
national wildlife refuges and Indian reservations. 3 16 In addition,
there is a smaller but biologically significant percentage of state and
private lands encompassed within the Greater Yellowstone
317
Ecosystem.

311. See, e.g., DE KLEMM, supra note 269, at 1; HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 40, at 33.
312. SOUTHERN APPALACHIAN MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE FOUNDATION, BYLAWS OF THE
SOUTHERN MAN AND THE BIOSPHERE FOUNDATION art. II (July 1988) (on file at the Center for
Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
313. Id. at 3-4.
314. HEALTHY EcosysrEMs, supra note 40, at 33, 37, 39,43-44.
315. See FRANK C. CRAIGHEAD, JR., TRACK OF THE GRIZZLY 239-40 (1979) (noting that the
appropriate area for grizzly habitat was the "Yellowstone ecosystem," a five million acre area
defined by the Craighead research team, as opposed to just the Yellowstone National Park).
316. Robert. B. Keiter, Taking Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology
in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 923, 937 (1989); GHOST BEARS, supra note
19, at 163.
317. Goldstein, supranote 146, at 5-6.
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In the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem, the first institutional
boundary obstacles emerged within sister agencies of the federal
government, the Forest Service and the National Park Service, where
different perceptions of mandate, inadequate coordination mechanisms, and entrenched agency cultures inhibited ecosystem management even within a single sovereign. To redress these problems,
these federal land management agencies revived a coordinating
mechanism first established in the 1960s known as the Greater
Yellowstone Coordinating Committee (GYCC). 318 The legal basis of
the coordination is a Memorandum of Understanding between the
regional offices of the two agencies that creates no enforceable obligations. 319 However, a 1985 Congressional Research Service (CRS)
report solicited by Congress concluded that this and the other
coordinating mechanisms in Greater Yellowstone were inadequate
"for providing complete, coordinated management of the Yellow320
stone ecosystem."
In the wake of the CRS report, and under the aegis of the Memorandum of Understanding, the GYCC launched a new program of
interagency coordination. Phase One examined all of the existing
planning efforts in the region by the two agencies to develop a
means of coordinating them. This became known as the Aggregation Report. 321 The agencies stopped short of preparing any sort
of regional plan, but, as a result of the Aggregation Report, the
GYCC did appoint a Regional Team Leader to coordinate management and planning. In Phase Two of the coordination plan, the
Team Leader was assigned responsibility for developing a "vision
for the future" document to "define management priorities within
322
the Yellowstone region."
Development of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem vision document became a highly politicized process and put agency staff,
environmentalists, and commodities groups at odds with one
another. After several abortive drafts, the document that ultimately
emerged apparently satisfied no one and failed to identify

318. Designed to improve communication, the Committee is comprised of forest supervisors from six national forests, the regional director of the Park Service, three regional
foresters and the superintendents of both Grand Teton and Yellowstone Park. Keiter, supra
note 316, at 985 n.302.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 986 (quoting CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, GREATER YELLOWSTONE ECOSYSTEM: AN ANALYSIS OF DATA SUBMITrED BY FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES 35, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (Comm. Print No. 6, Dec. 1986).

321. Id. (citing U.S. NATL PARK SERv., DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & U.S. FOREST SERV., DEP'T OF
AGRIC., AN AGGREGATION OF NATIONAL PARK AND NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT PLANS

(1987)).
322. Id. at 987.
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substantive regional management goals or suggest any coherent
regional ecosystem policy, either within the existing management
framework or through some other ecosystem-wide coordination
mechanism. 323 Moreover, there have been no further efforts at
administrative reform to expand the GYCC to reflect all of the management units within Greater Yellowstone. 324 More recently, however, a non-governmental organization, the Greater Yellowstone
Coalition, produced its own vision document, which is discussed
below. 325 In addition, there have been a number of bills put forth in
Congress to tackle the seemingly intractable task of coordinating
land management in the divisive atmosphere of Greater
Yellowstone.
5. The CaliforniaAgreement on Biological Diversity

California's Agreement on Biological Diversity is a state level soft
management coordination approach that merits discussion. The
Agreement on Biological Diversity is a memorandum of understanding (MOU), initially signed by ten state and federal environmental agencies. 326 The MOU resulted directly from the growing
number of endangered species conflicts in California and from a
recognition of the jurisdictional boundary dilemma in ecosystem
327
management.
The MOU creates a three-tiered soft management structure,
premised on geographic bioregions. The top tier is the statewide
executive council, chaired by the Secretary of the California Resources Agency, which was established to set statewide goals for the
protection of biodiversity, to seek funding, and, importantly, "to
develop the necessary state and regional institutions." 328 The
second tier consists of bioregional councils, made up of regional
administrators from signatory agencies who are to encourage participation by county governments, environmental groups, and in-

323. Goldstein, supranote 146, at 24-27.
324. Telephone Interview with Eric Glick, Executive Director, Greater Yellowstone Coalition, Bozeman, Montana (Oct. 13, 1995).
325. See infra notes 338-44 and the accompanying text.
326. THE RESOURCES AGENCY OF CALIFORNIA, MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, CALIFORNIA'S COORDINATED REGIONAL STRATEGY TO CONSERVE BIODIVERSry, "THE AGREEMENT ON

BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY" (Sept. 19, 1991) (on file at Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of
Florida College of Law) [hereinafter MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING]. The number of signatories was later increased to twenty-four. Douglas P. Wheeler, Forward: A Strategy for the
Future, 12 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. ix, xii (1993).
327. Deborah B. Jensen, Conservation Through Coordination: California's Experiment in Bioregional Councils, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND BIODIVERSrIY 273, 273 (R. Edward Grumbine
ed., 1994).
328. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 325, at V.A:
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dustry groups. These entities are charged with developing regional
biodiversity strategies and seeking "[riegional solutions to regional
issues." 329 Finally, the MOU calls for the formation of localized
watershed and landscape associations, in which the local staff of
signatory agencies will encourage participation by the local public,
landowners, and private organizations. These associations are encouraged to "develop specific cooperative projects" through a
"Coordinated Resource Management Planning process" 330 and are
the forum for local conflict resolution. 33 1 To some extent the biodiversity MOU appears to be a recognition of the grass roots bioregional movement in the United States. 332 Its proponents recognize
that grass roots watershed and landscape councils, local groups
forming biogeographic associations, already existed in California or
were forming in advance of the MOU's bioregional council structure.3 33 The biodiversity MOU may also suggest an effort to institutionalize the "epistemic community," or "shadow network" as it is
described in some of the Everglades literature; these networks are
often loose collaborations of agency and non-agency personnel who
pursue particular missions within institutions but without institutional sanction. 334 Despite its emphasis on voluntary action and
soft management, the California biodiversity MOU nonetheless
aroused the ire of local governments that feared it represented an
335
inroad into local government land use prerogatives.
It could be said that Florida, with its unique division of the state
into hydrogeographic units based on watersheds, already has the
bioregional (or at least hydroregional) institutional infrastructure
that California is seeking through the biodiversity MOU. However,
the California approach, with its identification of watershed and
landscape associations, represents an additional level of biogeographic decentralization, interagency cooperation, and grass roots

329. Id. at V.C.
330. This process relies on techniques used in the Coordinated Resource Management
Program, which was developed in the early 1900s and which coordinates state and federal
participants. Jensen, supra note 326, at 275 n.2 and accompanying text.
331. MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 325, at V.D.
332. See Donald Alexander, Bioregionalism: Science or Sensibility?, 12 ENVTL. ETHICS 161
(1990) (discussing the origins of the bioregional movement and offering a critique of its
decentralistic regionalism premises). Certain supporters of bioregionalism suggest that the
concept should be institutionalized through regional administrative structures. See generally
M.V.McGinnis, Bioregionalism: Reconciling Nature and the Bureaucratic Experience (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Santa Barbara (1993)).
333. Wheeler, supra note 325, at xiii.
334. This shadow network, sometimes described as an "informal collegia of scientists," is
critical for strategy, advanced learning, and innovation. Light, supranote 22, at 167.
335. Jensen, supra note 326, at 276-77.
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participation that may be instructive for governance of the Greater
Everglades Ecosystem.
E. Non-governmental Initiatives
Governance is inherently governmental, yet non-governmental
organizations can play a significant role in advocating appropriate
governance mechanisms. This is particularly true where effective
innovation threatens traditional boundaries and entrenched agency
cultures. In addition, as previously mentioned, political scientists
have long recognized the importance that organized nongovernmental interests, or epistemic communities, play in policy
336
development.
1. The Greater Yellowstone Coalition
Formed in 1983, the Greater Yellowstone Coalition (GY Coalition) is an advocacy group of citizen activists and local, regional, and
national sportsman and conservation groups dedicated to preserving
and protecting the Greater Yellowstone ecosystem. Perhaps disappointed with the progress toward ecosystem-based management
exhibited by the federal land management agencies and the vision
document described above, 337 the GY Coalition launched the Greater
Yellowstone Tomorrow Project in 1989. In the first phase of the
project, the GY Coalition produced a document called An Environmental Profile of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem. The GY Coalition
followed this ecosystem inventory profile with a comprehensive
ecosystem-based strategy entitled Sustaining Greater Yellowstone: A
Blueprintfor the Future (Blueprint).338
The GY Coalition's Blueprint is a thoughtful, wide-ranging,
regional analysis of ecosystem management and sustainable
development issues that includes a compendium of specific and nonspecific recommended reforms needed to achieve the coalition's
goals. The recommendations advocate changes in resource law,
including the passage of a Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem Act that
would address land management issues across institutional boundaries. 339 The recommendations also suggest specific changes in

336. LEE, supra note 192, at 130-32; P. Haas, SAVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: THE POLTICS OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION xxii-xxiii (John G. Ruggie ed., 1990).
337. See supranote 293 and accompanying text.
338. See generally BLUEPRINT, supranote 154.
339. The executive summary of the Blueprintsuggests that Congress should establish a new
"Sustainable Ecosystem" model for Greater Yellowstone. Id. at 7. Other recommendations
include, reforming the mining law, establishing base grazing fees, and reforming subdivision
laws. Id. at 9, 11, 12.
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resource administration and policy, including consolidation of the
numerous land management units within the ecosystem. 340
In addition to traditional ecosystem management reforms, the
Blueprint suggests a number of reforms related to economic policies
and tax incentives to encourage private participation in its sustainability goals. Furthermore, the Blueprint recommends changes in resource management to reduce subsidies and recognize carrying
capacities, and changes in science and education to develop compatible research standards and protocols, regionalize data collection, and
prioritize research. 341
Among the proposals particularly relevant to governance of a
greater ecosystem like the Everglades is the recommendation that the
boundaries of the Yellowstone Park International Biosphere Reserve
be extended to encompass all public lands within the Yellowstone
ecosystem. 342 Moreover, the Blueprint recommends the formation of
a biosphere reserve steering committee comprised of citizen's
groups, county, state, and federal governments, as well as regional
universities. The steering committee would. foster policy reforms
supported by science and provide a potential mechanism for dispute
resolution.34 3 The Blueprint also suggests forming, by interstate
compact, a Greater Yellowstone Sustainable Communities Board,
consisting of representatives of the three states and twenty counties
within the ecosystem. The Board would provide financial and technical assistance and foster interstate cooperation. In addition, the
Blueprintcalls for an interagency Biodiversity Assessment Committee
which would prepare a Biodiversity Conservation Plan with set objectives'for species and plant communities across administrative
boundaries. 344
2. The Northern Rockies Ecosystem ProtectionAct
The proposed Northern Rockies Ecosystem Protection Act (Bill)
was originally drafted and urged upon Congress by western grass
roots conservation organizations. 345 Although the Bill failed to
become law, it is significant to conservation biology because it

340. In particular, the Blueprint recommends a steering committee to represent all affected
interests and plan action. Id. at 7.
341. Id. at 13.
342. Id. at 12-13.
343. Id. at 9.
344. Id. at 13 (providing only an abbreviated description of the plan put forth in the full
text of Blueprint).
345. WILD ROCKIES ACMON FUND, NORTHERN ROCKIES ECOSYSTEM PROTEcrON ACT 1
(1993) (describing the genesis of the Act) (on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
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represents perhaps the first attempt to actually codify the current
346
reserve design principles emerging from relatively new science.
The Bill's ambitious objective was to utilize the new reserve design principles to integrate federal land management of more than
twenty million acres in five major western ecosystems across five
states in the Northern Rockies. 347 The boundary delineation for this
bioregion 348 was to be based at least in part on population viability
analyses of large free-ranging mammals, particularly wolves and
grizzly bears. 349 Essentially, the Bill advocated working within the
existing federal land management framework to expand the protected area designations of national parks and wilderness areas
within five semi-contiguous major ecosystem blocks. However, the
proposed law would have created a new federal land management
category referred to as "biological connecting corridors," consisting
of designated wildland areas located between the major ecosystems
blocks. 350 Special management criteria were proposed for application in these biological connecting corridors. 351 In addition, the Bill
designated certain degraded national forest lands as part of a
National Wildland Restoration and Recovery System, and would
have established a special unit within the Forest Service described as
352
the National Wildland Recovery Corps.
Interestingly, the Bill did not propose any novel administrative
framework for integrated management of the bioregion, but instead
deferred such considerations. The only coordination mechanism
proposed consisted of an interagency team to "monitor, evaluate,
and make adjustments to insure [sic] long term results." 353 The Bill
did, however, propose the formation of a governmental review
board which included private sector participation. The review board
was designated to evaluate federal agency goals and mandates
within the bioregion and "legally restate and unify the various
make
and
mandates,"
management
resource
agency

346. See generally Noss, supra note 100; Robert B. Keiter, Conservation Biology and the Law:
Assessing the Challenges Ahead, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 911, 911 (1994).
347. The five states include Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana and Wyoming. Mike
Bader, A Northern Rockies Proposalfor Congress, WILD EARTH, THE WILDLANDS PROJECT, PLOTTING A NORTH AMERICAN WILDERNESS RECOVERY STRATEGY 61, 61-62 (special issue 1992).
348. H.R. 2638, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(a)(2) (1993). This probably represents the first
time the term "bioregion" has been formally used in an articulated legislative proposal. California, of course, made it administrative policy in its biodiversity MOU, as discussed previously. See MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING, supra note 325 and accompanying text.
349. Bader, supra note 346, at 62.
350. H.R. 2638, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4 (1993).
351. Id.
352. Id. § 9.
353. Id. § 12(b).
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recommendations to Congress within three years. 3 4 Because the Bill
355
failed, these mechanisms were never tested.
F. Governance and the Greater Everglades Ecosystem
Two major governmental efforts to coordinate ecosystem management are underway in South Florida.3 56 Each created a soft
management advisory body, and each contains federal and state
representatives. The Everglades ecosystem is also currently the focus
of both federal and state ecosystem management demonstration
projects. In addition, there is a significant non-governmental and
academic interest in ecosystem level activities, including an Everglades Coalition of environmental groups and a major initiative of a
charitable foundation to support systemwide approaches to Everglades issues. Moreover, the Everglades is included as a case study
in a nationwide ecosystem policy study by the Keystone Center in
Boulder, Colorado. Seemingly forgotten in the midst of these efforts,
is the Governor's Office's Save Our Everglades Program, perhaps the
3 57
oldest institutional effort to view the Everglades as a system.
1. The South FloridaTask Forcefor Ecosystem Restoration
The Clinton administration established an Interagency Task
Force on the South Florida Ecosystem as one of four pilot projects in
ecosystem management. The task force is chaired by the Assistant
Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks of the Department of
Interior, and has representatives from the Department of Commerce,
Department of the Army (Civil Works), EPA, Department of Justice,

354. Id. § 12(d).
355. The Bill was touted as an attempt to "save the biotic 'parts,'" based on Aldo Leopold's
statement that "the first step in intelligent tinkering is to save all the parts." Bader, supra note
346, at 61, 64. Despite support from over 200 organizations, and perhaps because of a lack of
endorsement by mainstream national conservation organizations, the Bill died in Congress. Id.
at 64. Perhaps the Bill received insufficient support because it aspired to prevent numerous
road building and timber sales development projects already planned by the United States
Forest Service. Id. at 62.
356. One of these is the South Florida Task Force for Ecosystem Restoration. See INTERAGENCY AGREEMENT, supra note 77. The other is the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable
South Florida which was established by executive order. Florida Exec. Order No. 94-54 (Mar. 3,
1994).
357. At the urging of Art Marshall and other environmentalists who advocated a unified
program of restoration from the headwaters of the Kissimmee River to Florida Bay, Friends of
the Everglades, For the Future of Florida: Repair the Everglades (3d ed., 1982), Governor Bob
Graham began the Save Our Everglades program in 1983, which continued through the
administration of his Republican successor, Bob Martinez, and continues in the Lawton Chiles
administration. OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, SAVE OUR EVERGLADES: TENTH ANNIVERSARY, 19831993 (1993). The overall goal of the program was that by the year 2000, the Everglades would
appear and function more like it did in 1900.
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Department of Transportation, and Department of Agriculture.358
An Interagency Working Group of local federal representatives was
also established to assist the task force with the plans, policies, and
priorities necessary for addressing South Florida ecosystem
35 9
concerns.
During its first year, the Task Force and Working Group assisted
the Corps in redesigning the Central and Southern Florida Project,
and with several other projects. In addition, the Task Force and
Working Group developed proposals for multispecies recovery
planning, a regional wetlands conservation plan, a Florida Bay science plan, and several other initiatives. 360 In one major aspect, however, the task force was limited. Because of the Federal Advisory
Committee Act,361 the working group could not include representatives from state or local agencies. In 1995, that deficiency was
remedied by the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act, and the. group
362
now includes state and tribal representatives.
2. The Governor's Commissionfor a SustainableSouth Florida
The other major effort at intergovernmental and interest group
coordination in the Everglades is the Governor's Commission for a
Sustainable South Florida (GCSSF). The GCSSF is composed of
thirty-five voting members representing all of the state, regional, and
local agencies involved in the management of growth in South
Florida, as well as representatives of major interest groups.363 There
364
are also five non-voting federal representatives.
The GCSSF was charged with numerous tasks, including a review of existing planning and regulatory programs affecting the
Everglades ecosystem, and recommending strategies for improved
management.
The GCSSF recently released its initial report,
including conclusions and specific recommendations relating to

358. INTERAGENcY AGREEMENT, supranote 77, at iv.
359. Id.
360. WORKING GROUP ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 78.
361. 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 14 (1994).
362. The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 modified the Federal Advisory Committee Act mandate by exempting meetings of federal agencies with state, local and tribal officials
for the purpose of exchanging views, information or advice relating to shared responsibilities.
2 U.S.C. § 1534(b) (1994). In addition, the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act requires agencies to
"develop an effective process to permit elected officers of State, local, and tribal governments
... to provide meaningful and timely input in the development of regulatory proposals
containing significant Federal intergovernmental mandates." Id. § 1534(a).
363. Florida Exec. Order No. 94-54 (Mar. 3,1994).
364. Id.
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regional governance. 365 This report specifically identifies the boundary problems inherent in the present institutional framework for
environmental management in South Florida.366 The report states
that "the broad and difficult problem of restoration, sustainability,
and systematic management of the region's resources" is "not
achieved by coordination but by unification." 367 The report concludes that "[u]nfortunately, a system of governance which could
368
provide this unification does not currently exist in the region."
The recommendations reflect both procedural reforms and coordination efforts designed to improve regional governance capacity.
The principle procedural reforms advocated concern the coordination of existing local and regional planning efforts. Perhaps the
most significant of these is a recommendation that local land use
planning be held to a compatibility standard with the water management district's water supply planning.369 Although "compatibility" is a weaker standard than the "consistency" standard presently
imposed on local government land development action,370 this
recommendation represents a significant procedural reform with
371
substantive ramifications for regional goverance.
In addition, the GCSSF recommends that the Department of
Community Affairs reject any revised local government comprehensive plan as "not in compliance" if the District and DEP determine that the amendment will negatively impact the sustainability of
natural systems.372 In essence, these recommendations would shift
power to the only entity in the Greater Everglades Ecosystem with
boundaries that coincide with the ecosystem.
Another recommendation for procedural reform calls for mandatory coordination among the five regional planning councils (RPCs)
within the Greater Everglades Ecosystem. The RPCs, comprised of

365. By holding meetings of the federal interagency working group in conjunction with the
Governor's Commission meeting, communication among the federal, state and local participants was enhanced. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 64, at 158-66.
366. Id. at 158.
367. Id.

368. Id.
369. Id. at 50.

Cf. Tschinkel Commission Recommendations, supra note 63, at 27, 36

(recommending that Strategic Regional Policy Plans should be compatible with the rule
adopted portions of water management district plans, but that local governments should not be
required to follow district plans).
370. FLA. STAT. §§ 163.3177(10)(a), 163.3194 (1995); FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 9J-5.021(2)
(1995).
371. See, Siemon, Larsen & Purdy, The Florida Water Resources Act of 1972 and Comprehensive Planning in the State of Florida (Feb. 1989) (unpublished report for the South Florida
Water Management District).
372. GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supranote 63, at 51.
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373
local government representatives and gubernatorial appointees,
are required to adopt Strategic Regional Policy Plans (SRPPs) to
guide local governments in their planning efforts. There is no
requirement for coordination among the RPCs in South Florida,
however, and limited authority to require the consistency of local
374
plans with the SRPPs.
In terms of actual regional governance mechanisms, the Commission recommends the creation of two new coordination mechanisms, an Everglades Charter and an Everglades Partnership, as well
as the perpetuation of the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable
South Florida, or some similar advisory body. The Everglades
Charter would be a combined state and federal task force to replace
Force. 375 It
the present South Florida Ecosystem Restoration Task 376
would have similar advisory and coordinating functions.
The Everglades Partnership would be a private, nonprofit corporation, with representation by universities, environmental groups,
business leaders, and governmental agencies. 377 It would have a
strong scientific review function. Finally, the Governor's Commission would continue to review and monitor all of the other planning
and coordination efforts, and would continue building community
consensus. 378 The report states that the Commission's role as a
regional governance institution "would not be limited to an advisory

capacity," 3 79 yet there is little in the report to suggest any additional

authority. Moreover, the Commission does not offer any specific
suggestions concerning how, and under what circumstances, it
would exercise even an advisory capacity.
G. Conclusion - Ecosystem Governance in the GreaterEverglades
The unique circumstances of South Florida probably ensures that
none of the existing ecosystem-level coordination mechanisms
discussed above will satisfy the governance needs of the Everglades
ecosystem. Each of the existing mechanisms developed from a
unique political and social history and specific environmental
circumstances, and are tailored accordingly. Moreover, it can be
argued that none of these mechanisms approach the level of
complexity posed by the Everglades in terms of sheer numbers of

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

FLA. STAT. § 186.504 (1995).
FLA. STAT. § 186.507(13) (1995).
Id. at 159.
Id. at 160.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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jurisdictions, let alone by the ecological and political aspects of
governance in a human-dominated, intensively managed watershed.
Florida's strong tradition of local government home rule and
antipathy for imposed solutions does not bode well for proposals
380
emanating from Washington or Florida's capitol in Tallahassee.
The State's experience with the controversial "Area of Critical State
Concern" program during the 1970s provides convincing evidence in
this regard.381 Nonetheless, many elements of the multijurisdictional
approaches adopted by other regions, as well as the political lessons
they provide, offer guidance in regional institutional design that may
be beneficial in the Greater Everglades Ecosystem.
The strategies currently proposed by the Governor's Commission
for a Sustainable South Florida and the federal South Florida
Interagency Task Force, while notable, do not fundamentally change
the institutional framework that has allowed ecosystem decline.
Both reflect coordination efforts that attempt to breach, but not
dissolve, the institutional boundaries that proponents of the ecosystem management paradigm contend impede true ecosystem
management. Indeed, the Governor's Commission recommended an
increase in the number of institutions operating in the ecosystem,
adding three new institutions with overlapping mandates. A measure of more fundamental institutional reform may be required to
break the cycle of crisis-precipitated "barriers and bridges" that has
characterized the Everglades' turbulent history. 382 Ironically, many
of the procedural, administrative, and regulatory reforms currently
underway in the name of federalism and streamlining, both in
Florida and the United States, appear well-suited to the development
of an ecosystem governance paradigm premised on regionalism.

380. For a discussion of local antipathy to regional governance, see J. Kincaid, Regulatory
Regionalism in Metropolitan Areas: Voter Resistance and Reform Persistence, 13 PAcE L. REV. 449
(1993).
381. Acclaimed nationally as a state land use innovation, the law authorized the state to
declare critically important resource areas and exert regulatory oversight over local land use
decisions in those areas. See ROBERT G. HEALY, LAND USE AND THE STATES (1979). The law met
with intense local resistance, particularly in the Florida Keys. Thomas T. Ankersen, Coping
With Growth: The Emergence of Environmental Policy in Florida66-95 (1982) (unpublished master's
thesis, U. of S.Fla., on file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College
of Law).
382. For a complete description of the turbulent Everglades history, see Ught, supra note
22, at 103-69. "A barrier is an impediment or obstacle to renewal or sustainability; a bridge is
an enhancement of steps to the same goal." Id. at 151. These "barriers and bridges are
intimately linked to... the multiplicity of goals... derived by humans ... in attempting to
control... a turbulent environment." Id.
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1. The Inter-sovereign Compact: A Hard Management Institutional
Reform Model
Parallel institutional reform at the state and federal level, shifting
governance to the regional level through an agreed framework for
shared-sovereign management, and possibly including a federal/
state/tribal/local compact, could result in improved ecosystem
management in the Everglades. The Columbia Gorge National
Scenic Area legislation and compact is a particularly useful model of
a similar regional framework. Within this general reform framework, a myriad of methods can be utilized to craft an ecosystemlevel governance mechanism.
At the federal level, there appears to be an unnecessarily fragmented land management framework in South Florida. Federal
lands management is shared by three cabinet-level departments
(Interior, Commerce, and Defense), four agencies (the National Park
Service, the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Army Corps of Engineers,
and the National Atmospheric and Oceanic Administration), and six
major administrative units (Everglades National Park, Big Cypress
National Preserve, Biscayne National Park, Florida Keys National
Marine Sanctuary, Loxahatchee National Wildlife Refuge, and the
Central and Southern Florida Project). Rather than having components of the ecosystem managed by separate but equal bureaucratic
administrative units in different agencies and departments, management units could be consolidated into a single entity that manages
the federally owned components of the ecosystem in a more holistic
fashion. 383 This, coupled with other procedural reforms, would
reduce the need for interagency coordination mechanisms at the
federal level, and eliminate artificial, and sometimes unintended,
procedural barriers to joint projects by discrete agencies. The
National Park Service is considering a restructuring that would
cluster parks within a single "system office" grouped loosely along
ecosystem lines,384 but this alone would not completely resolve the
federal interjurisdictional problem in South Florida. Significantly,
the President's Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force has
specifically recommended the reconfiguration of land management

383. This approach was recommended by the Greater Yellowstone Coalition for the multiplicity of units of the United States Forest Service in the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
BLUEPRINT, supranote 154.
384. To some extent, the national forests in Florida already function under the framework
approach which the Park Service is considering. See generally NAT'L PARK SERv., RECOMMENDATION FOR RESTRUCTURING THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE (July 1994); NAT L PARK SERV.,
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT IN THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, DISCUSSION DRAFT (Sept. 1994) (on
file at the Center for Govtl. Responsibility, University of Florida College of Law).
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agency boundaries in appropriate circumstances to achieve
385
ecosystem management.
The Corps remains the most significant federal institutional actor
in the Greater Everglades Ecosystem. Yet the Corps' non-regulatory
responsibilities, which until recently largely related to navigation,
flood control, and the construction and maintenance of the Central
and Southern Florida Project, could plausibly be assumed by the
local sponsor, the South Florida Water Management District. One
approach to phasing out the federal role in the Central and Southern
Florida Project, for example, might permit the Corps to conclude
planning efforts for the Restudy, and after approval by Congress,
delegate implementation to the District with ongoing provisions for
federal funding. The Clinton administration recently proposed
studying similar possibilities in the context of federal water projects
generally. 386 This localized control would be consistent with notions
of federalism currently proposed by Congress in other areas of
public administration. Moreover, Florida is already seeking assumption of much of the Corps' environmental regulatory authority.
The South Florida Water Management District is already an ecosystem level governance institution. It possesses many attributes of
management that commentators have suggested are necessary for
successful regional governance, including regulatory authority, independent financing capacity, and a strong technical capacity, as well
as an ecosystem mandate. However, not all the sovereigns extant in
the Everglades ecosystem are represented by the District. Currently,
the District Governing Board is comprised only of the Governor's
political appointees from within the District.
One approach to reconfigure this governance structure might be
to provide local governments (at least at the county level or through
Regional Planning Councils), the Indian Tribes, the State of Florida,
and the federal government with participation on the Governing
Board, possibly through a compact arrangement. Another approach
might be to redefine the "Greater Everglades Ecosystem" to coincide
with the larger South Florida watershed and create a parallel management entity with supervisory authority over proposed ecosystem
activities using similar principles of comity among sovereigns. Any
revamped ecosystem governance unit should be required to develop
an ecosystem management plan which, depending on the degree of

385. HEALTHY ECOSYSrEMS, supranote 40, at 9.
386. This is part of the President's "Reinventing Government" initiative and is thought to
advance two goals: cutting federal government costs and "fostering local control of facilities
that most directly affect local agencies." Federal Facilities Transfer Program Moves Unevenly
Along, CAL. WATER L. & POL'Y REPORTER (1995).
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autonomy desired, could be subject to approval by the State through
DEP, the Governor and Cabinet, and by the federal government. An
appropriate method for reconciling federal and state ecosystem
planning and management under a single umbrella should be
considered, as in the Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area.
Local government land use planning should be consistent with
the regional ecosystem plan, as contemplated by the Governor's
Commission for a Sustainable South Florida and the State Land and
Water Task Force. 387 Delegation of federal and state environmental
regulatory and management authority to the ecosystem level should
continue, with the caveat that federal procedural safeguards, e.g.,
NEPA and ESA consultation and citizen intervention, must be
implemented at the state and district level through legislation, and
that state and federal oversight of these programs is maintained.
2. Mandatory Consultation: Soft Management CoordinationMechanism Models
Even in the absence of a shift toward regional governance
through the reallocation of power, significant advances can be made
with a soft management approach. Indeed, the Governor's Commission for a Sustainable South Florida apparently offers such an
approach, albeit somewhat unwieldy given the multiplicity of soft
management coordination mechanisms recommended. 38 The Commission's Initial Report is vague, however, on the means by which
the coordination would be carried out on a day-to-day basis.
The Cape Code National Seashore Commission may provide an
appropriate model to consider. Even though it relies on soft management techniques, the Cape Cod Commission is viewed as highly
effective in promoting regional governance. 389 A key factor of this
perception may be the mandatory consultation requirement included
in the Commission's authorizing legislation. Actions that may affect
the Seashore must first be submitted to the Commission for review.
Although the Commission's review is advisory, the procedural
formality creates a forum for independent scrutiny which the
Commission takes seriously.

387. See GOvERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 63; Tschinkel Commission, supra note 63.
388. See generally GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION, supra note 63.
389. Interestingly, the Water Management District Review Commission rejected the
concept of non-district-staff advisory committees to advise the Governing Boards. WATER
MANAGEMENT DISTRICr REVIEW COMMISSION, PRELMINARY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE WATER
MANAGEMENT DISRICT REVIEW COMMISSION RELATING TO DISTRICr GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT DETERMINED IN MEETINGS OF AUGUST 23-25, 1995, at 2 (1995).
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This mandatory consultation approach is also used in the New
Jersey Pinelands Reserve, requiring consultation between the Pinelands Commission and the Municipal Council. In addition, mandatory consultation provisions have been effective in federal environmental legislation such as the ESA and NEPA.
Mandatory consultation could be implemented in conjunction
with the soft management approaches advocated by the Governor's
Commission for the Everglades ecosystem. Under this framework,
significant decisions of the District, the federal government, and
other governance entities that may affect the ecological integrity of
the ecosystem, would be subject to mandatory, but non-binding,
review by an advisory board such as the Governor's Commission.
The USMAB offers another useful soft management coordination
mechanism model that should be considered for the Everglades
ecosystem. The USMAB model focuses on interdisciplinary research,
education, intergovernmental coordination, and public participation.
It explicitly recognizes the need to accommodate humans within the
ecosystem and the artificiality of management boundaries, the key
ingredients in principles of ecosystem management. Despite the
explicit soft management mandate, however, the USMAB program
has been cramped in the United States by a reluctance to expand
biosphere reserve initiatives beyond individual land management
units, even where the units are publicly owned. 39° This reluctance is
manifest in the Everglades Biosphere Reserve designation, which is
limited to Everglades National Park, and tends to demonstrate how
much of a change is required to achieve the goals of ecosystem
However, this reluctance was overcome in the
management.
Southern Appalachian USMAB Cooperative, which incorporated
three designated reserves within a multijurisdictional regional
boundary. That Cooperative was cited by the President's Interagency Ecosystem Management Task Force as an example of what
391
does work.
Both the Everglades Charter and the Everglades Partnership proposed by the Governor's Commission encompass objectives that
could be accomplished by an expanded biosphere reserve program
in the Everglades ecosystem. Moreover, explicitly adopting this
regional biosphere reserve model and program in South Florida
could bring with it the added value associated with inclusion within
an international research and information network based on common parameters for comparative study and application.

390. See Sax & Keiter, supra note 42, at 253-57.
391. HEALTHY ECOSYSTEMS, supra note 40, at 35-37.

